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PREFACE 
he EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) is the flagship climate 
policy tool of the EU. The objective of the EU ETS cap-and-trade 
system has been to create incentives for companies to reduce 
emissions in the most cost-effective way, to reward carbon-efficiency and to 
create incentives for new and innovative approaches to reduce emissions. 
The new ETS Directive, applying from 2013, has set auctioning as a 
default allocation method. For industry, the Directive foresees transitional 
free allocation based on ex ante benchmarks, where possible, which will be 
phased out for sectors not exposed to carbon leakage in steps by 2027. 
Benchmarking as an allocation methodology has been chosen to avoid the 
perverse effects of grandfathering and because it has the potential to ensure 
a non-distorted carbon price signal, to reward early action and more 
generally carbon efficiency. Thus, benchmarks per se do not offer 
incentives to improve performance; it is ultimately the carbon price under 
the EU ETS that will determine the level of the incentive to improve 
performance.  
In parallel with the Swedish presidency, it has been my privilege over 
the past six months to chair the CEPS Task Force on “Benchmarking for the 
EU ETS and Beyond” with a view to providing key messages and policy 
recommendations, first to the European Commission, then to the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers and also to a wider range of 
international stakeholders. The work has been made possible thanks to the 
members of the Task Force, including a wide range of business, industry, 
research and environmental NGOs, who gave their expertise and time, 
presenting the viewpoints of different interests. The Task Force is 
particularly indebted to Hubert van den Bergh, who by contributing his 
practical experience with the Dutch and Flemish energy-efficiency 
benchmarking covenants, set the scene for the Task Force discussions. I 
would also like to thank the European Commission, Ecofys, member state 
officials and industry representatives who generously shared their 
expertise and reflections, and through their contributions and advice, 
h e l p e d  u s  t o  r e m a i n  f o c u s e d  o n  w hat soon became a rapidly emerging 
agenda. Last but not least, we were fortunate enough to be able to rely on 
CEPS’ support throughout the Task Force. 
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This CEPS Task Force Report is intended as a description of 
benchmarks and benchmarking, outlining previous experiences and lessons 
learned for the development of the product benchmarks under the EU ETS 
for its third phase. While proposing a number of key principles to which 
benchmarks and benchmarked-based allocation should adhere, the CEPS 
Task Force also identified several recommendations crucial to the European 
Commission’s future work. 
Discussions were always rich, the debate was at times intense and I 
believe that this Task Force has made a constructive contribution to the 
important work on establishing product benchmarks under the EU ETS 
and possibly to other international equivalents. 
 
Anna Törner 
Chair of the CEPS Task Force 
Head of Section, Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, 
Sweden 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he revised EU Emissions Trading (EU ETS) Directive (2009/29/EC 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC) grants transitional free allocation 
to the industrial sector to address competitiveness questions. This 
has created a challenge for EU policy-makers to design a system whereby 
such free allocation can be implemented in a way compatible with the EU’s 
single market and the EU’s objective to achieve targets for greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reductions in the most efficient way. The revised ETS 
Directive has thus chosen ex ante benchmarks. While to date most of the 
focus in the EU has been on benchmark-based allocation, it has revived the 
interest in benchmarks more generally. In particular, it has heightened 
awareness of and identified lessons from previous benchmarking 
experiences in the EU and member states, which are considerable.  
The development of benchmarks and benchmarking offers more 
possibilities than being just a tool for allocation under an emissions trading 
system. Allocation is only one – even a small – yet politically very 
contentious and currently most immediate application. Therefore, this 
CEPS Task Force report gives the principal attention to how to identify and 
use benchmarks. It takes a broad approach and examines the potential 
merits of benchmarks and benchmarking both for managing the transition 
to a low-carbon economy in national climate-change strategies and for the 
provisions of a global climate-change agreement. The latter describes the 
potential of benchmarks for deepening and accelerating climate change 
mitigation, i.e. leading to real reductions here and now, even in the absence 
of a comprehensive, legally binding agreement at the global level, which 
will eventually be required.  
Finally, it must not be forgotten that benchmarks under the EU ETS 
per se do not offer incentives to improve performance; it is ultimately the 
carbon price that will determine the level of incentive to improve 
performance.  
I.  Key messages 
General 
1)  Benchmarking is a very broad concept that has been used for a 
variety of purposes in different applications. Traditionally, 
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benchmarking processes have been tools for judging and improving 
industry performance. A ‘benchmark’ is a performance measure 
based on agreed and verified parameters (e.g. sector boundary, 
performance indicators), 1   not necessarily at the highest level of 
performance. ‘Benchmarking’ applies this benchmark to a particular 
purpose with the allocation of free emission rights being but one. 
Other possibilities for benchmarking in the context of climate change 
policies are its use as a regulatory scheme to set (industry) 
performance targets; to define (sectoral or national) GHG emission 
caps in a bottom-up fashion; to judge the national, EU-wide or 
international ‘comparability’ of sector efforts (both intra- and inter-
sectoral); to establish the level of carbon credits that are granted 
under the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and/or of the 
new post-2012 period; and to calculate the carbon content of products 
(e.g. for carbon footprinting). Historically, numerous sectors (e.g. 
refining, aluminium, cement, steel and power) have used benchmarks 
for evaluating and comparing the performance of installations with 
the aim of improving such performance or that of the overall sector, 
or both. While companies seem to appreciate that the use of 
benchmarks enhances performance, independent analysis of the 
effectiveness of benchmarking in helping to reduce GHG emissions 
and overall sector performance is, however, limited if at all available. 
2)  Preconditions for developing benchmarks are the availability of 
common definitions, reliable data (including on historical 
production), good measurement and verification systems. Good 
benchmarks will require considerable efforts by all stakeholders, and 
in the end acceptability, as access to industry data is critical. Efforts to 
develop benchmarks are more likely to be successful if benchmarking 
is deemed crucial to achieve a political or industry objective, if it adds 
value or is politically relevant and if the benchmarks are developed in 
a practical and pragmatic way.  
Benchmarks may be derived from different sources. Those derived 
from arbitrary targets or the literature are easier to construct but tend 
to be unreliable and non-transparent. In addition, they often use 
                                                      
1  Typical performance indicators are profitability, safety records and resource 
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margins. Benchmarks based on calculations and practical 
measurements are preferable but their identification requires the 
most effort and can incur potentially high costs for those engaged in 
identifying them. The costs can be broken down into three categories: 
i) those related to defining the benchmark, ii) those related to data 
collection and iii) the running costs for measurement, reporting and 
verification (MRV). The most significant costs are the running costs 
for MRV of greenhouse gas emissions; however, these costs would 
generally also arise under the ETS and any other GHG regulation. 
Costs for data collection, which in some cases can be significant too, 
and for defining a benchmark, are directly related to benchmarking. 
The latter costs tend to be small compared with running costs and the 
costs for data collection. The revised EU ETS Directive foresees that 
benchmarks are based on products, i.e. a specific performance per 
unit of output, to maximise incentives for greenhouse gas reductions 
through each production process of the sector. The complexity of 
establishing a benchmark typically increases if the same products are 
made by different raw materials or if processes produce more than 
one product, in some cases requiring benchmarks for intermediate 
products. Benchmarks are easier if they are based solely on direct 
emissions.  
EU benchmark-based allocation  
The revised ETS Directive prescribes EU-wide ex ante benchmarks for 
transitional free allocation, “to the extent feasible” (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 73). The starting point is the 
average of the 10% most efficient installations in sectors or sub-sectors, 
calculated on products. Benchmarks shall take into account “the most 
efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes, high 
efficiency cogeneration, efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of 
biomass and capture and storage of CO2, where such facilities are 
available” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009, 
p. 73). In areas where benchmarks are not feasible, a combination of 
generic, so-called ‘fallback approaches’ – such as a benchmark for 
combustion processes and grandfathering for process emissions – will have 
to be applied.  
The amount of free allowances per installation is intended to be 
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production – currently being discussed is the period of either 2005–07 or 
2005–08 – while the maximum total free allocation for industry is set at the 
industry’s share of the total cap based on emissions in 2005–07. The 
maximum number of free allowances will decline annually in line with the 
decline of the emissions ceiling (the ‘linear factor’) by 21% between 2005 
and 2020. A “uniform and cross-sectoral correction factor” (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 73) will be applied 
if the allowances based on the benchmarks multiplied by the production 
factor, plus the other free allowances for industry based on fallback 
approaches, exceed the cap. According to the revised ETS Directive, free 
allocation ends in 2027 at the latest. 
3)  The ongoing preparation (Ecofys et al., 2009a) of benchmarks for the 
EU ETS has delivered a number of practical principles relating to 
technology and correction factors, the number of benchmarks and the 
relationship between energy efficiency and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
performance. This Task Force has identified ’ground rules’, such as to 
i) ensure (environmental) effectiveness, ii) incentivise GHG and 
energy efficiency, and iii) avoid damaging competitiveness. In 
addition, more operational ones have been identified, such as iv) 
equal treatment of all sectors, v) equal treatment of all installations in 
a (sub-)sector, vi) transparency (to non-specialists as well), and finally 
vii) practical and pragmatic (not perfect) approaches to reduce 
administrative complexity and minimise cost. An overall objective of 
the development of benchmarks is avoiding distortions to 
competition in the EU internal market. 
4)  The development of benchmarks and the benchmarking process has 
distributional impacts compared with the existing, predominant 
allocation methodology (i.e. historical grandfathering). Decisions on 
sector boundaries or the choice of product for the application of 
benchmarks could benefit some installations or companies within a 
sector over others, e.g. by rewarding early action, but could also 
restrict reduction possibilities. At the same time, the setting of the 
benchmark determines the total number of allowances a sector 
receives and how this compares with other sectors. The formulation 
of and adherence to ex ante agreed principles to guide the 
development and application of benchmarks is likely to be required 
to ensure acceptability, because it will allow stakeholders to test the 
benchmarks and their application against the agreed principles.  BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | vii 
 
5)  The revised ETS Directive provides that benchmarks for products are 
developed, in principle, based on data from all installations. This 
reflects the fact that the exclusion of installations has a significant 
impact on the level of the benchmark and should therefore only be 
applied in exceptional circumstances. 
6)  There are just a few key sectors or sub-sectors where benchmarks are 
difficult to develop. Initial estimates for the EU show that, with 50 to 
60 benchmarks, 85% of the emissions in EU ETS installations that are 
eligible for free allocation can be covered.  
7)  Competitiveness is addressed in the revised ETS Directive through 
the free allocation of allowances (up to the benchmark). Ex ante 
benchmark-based allocation in the EU is a means to allow free 
allocation to take place. The ex ante benchmark-based allocation will 
not necessarily stop any change in production patterns. Yet, it is a 
way to offset the increased costs for industry and may act as an 
incentive to continue producing in the EU during the period covered. 
Still, there is no guarantee that the revenues from free allocation will 
be invested in EU installations. 
8)  Benchmarking for the purpose of allocation requires both a 
benchmark and an activity rate, by which the benchmark would need 
to be multiplied in order to establish the total number of allowances 
to be granted. The use of verified historical production levels reduces 
the possibility of over-allocation by avoiding projections and 
allowing the allocation of allowances to installations to be set in 
advance, except in cases where production becomes drastically lower 
than the historical reference, e.g. as a result of an economic crisis.  
9)  In the absence of full auctioning of allowances, the allocation to an 
operator based on a benchmark can define the incentives for emission 
reductions. Once the benchmarks are known, any future changes to 
the allocation will be the result of possible modifications to the cap as 
a consequence of an international agreement or to changes in the 
rules on closures and new entrants.  
10)  The availability of robust and verified data, including production 
data, does not appear to be an issue that would prevent EU allocation 
by benchmarks, largely thanks to the EU ETS always having required 
accurate monitoring, reporting and verification.  viii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
II.  Recommendations  
The experience of benchmarking in the current EU ETS trading period 
shows that benchmarking is a feasible and useful allocation tool. The first 
estimations following the EU ETS benchmarking exercise indicate that, 
with a limited number of benchmarks, a large amount of emissions can be 
covered. Emissions that cannot be covered by benchmarks need to be 
subject to fallback approaches. Against this background, this CEPS Task 
Force has formulated the following recommendations: 
1)  The development of benchmarks must be tailored to their application, 
such as allocation, crediting under flexible mechanisms or the 
comparability of industry performance.  
2)  The EU should take a practical and pragmatic approach to 
benchmark-based allocation in a collaborative manner with 
stakeholders, to allow for rapid and efficient implementation from 
both an environmental and economic perspective.  
3)  Benchmarking should provide incentives to reduce GHG intensity 
through technology and fuel neutrality; there should be no 
differentiation between old and new plants, or correction factors for 
plant age, size, raw material quality or climate circumstances. 
4)  Where a fallback methodology is used for allocation instead of a 
benchmark, it must be fully transparent – also to the non-specialist. 
Furthermore, fallback options must be fair and stringent, and should 
not result in any undue disadvantage to any of the sectors covered by 
the ETS.  
5)  Exclusions of installations from benchmarks (and thereby the 
benchmark curve) should be minimised and should only be accepted 
against pre-determined and transparent criteria.  
6)  Benchmarks for more than one product in a sector should be 
considered if this offers the possibility to achieve significant, 
additional GHG reductions. 
7)  The EU should use its experience with the ETS benchmark-based 
allocations to inform benchmarking efforts in other countries, 
especially within the context of international climate-change 
negotiations, e.g. a reformed Clean Development Mechanism or 
sectoral crediting.   
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INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
he new EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive 2 has  set 
auctioning as a default allocation method. As of 2013, 100% of 
allowances are to be auctioned in the power sector, although limited 
and optional derogations are available for the 10 new member states.3 For 
industry, the Directive foresees transitional free allocation based on ex ante 
benchmarks, where possible, which will be phased out for sectors not 
exposed to carbon leakage in steps by 2027 (starting at 80% in 2013 and 
decreasing to 30% in 2020). There will be 100% free allocation up until 2020 
for the exposed sectors that were identified by the European Commission 
in September 2009.  
Free allocation will be based on benchmarks, determined ex ante at 
least where possible. Allocation will also be determined ex ante (i.e. no ex 
post adjustment for actual or recent production except in cases of closures 
and partially ceased production, yet to be defined). The performance curve 
from which the benchmark will be derived must take into account among 
other factors the most efficient techniques, high efficiency cogeneration, 
efficient energy use of waste gases, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
The starting point is the average of the 10% most efficient installations in 
sectors or sub-sectors, in terms of greenhouse gases (GHGs). In areas where 
                                                      
2 See Directive No. 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, OJ L 
140/63, 05.06.2009; see also the article “EU ETS post-2012” on the European 
Commission’s website, last updated 23.03.2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/climat/emission/ets_post2012_en.htm). 
3 Derogations are linked to the requirement to modernise the electricity sector and 
subject to ex ante approval by the European Commission. 
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benchmarks are not feasible, there is a need for a generic approach such as 
grandfathering, an efficiency improvement factor or a benchmark for 
combustion processes. The amount of free allowances per installation is 
intended to be established by multiplying the benchmarks by the historical 
average production, for example for the period 2005–07, whereby the 
maximum total free allocation for industry is set at the industry’s share in 
the total cap based on emissions in that period. The maximum number of 
free allowances will decline annually in line with the decline of the 
emissions cap (by 21% between 2005 and 2020). A uniform correction factor 
will be applied if the allowances based on the benchmarks multiplied by 
the production factor exceed the cap.  
In addition, the European Commission, led by the Directorate-
General (DG) for Competition, is revising the EU’s state aid guidelines to 
define the maximum level of financial support allowed by member states in 
favour of those sectors determined to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage owing to indirect costs, as foreseen in the Directive. The 
level of support is equally established on the basis of ex ante benchmarks, 
the most efficient available technologies and the relevant European 
electricity production mix.  
To ensure technical or other input by the relevant sectors and 
stakeholders, the European Commission has been undertaking numerous 
stakeholder meetings and bilateral consultations to ensure transparent and 
effective consultation. In addition, the European Commission has 
contracted a consultant (Ecofys et al., 2009a) to assist in designing the 
allocation rules for free allocation for all relevant activities and to assess 
(additional) data requirements. The Directive requires the allocation 
methodologies and by extension the benchmarks to be adopted before the 
end of 2010.  
Benchmarking can be a tool that goes beyond allocation alone. 
Benchmarking processes have traditionally been tools for judging and 
improving performance in industry. Benchmarking and ranking exercises 
in refining and other industries have proven to be able to enhance the 
‘price’ signal, which in many instances has allowed a situation to persist 
where (sometimes large) differences in performance have continued to 
exist. Ranking can point to these differentials, inducing (self-interested) 
actions by industry. Benchmarking also offers a possibility to inform EU 
and member state industrial policy (e.g. give indications of performance, 
potential and technological challenges).  BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 3 
 
Internationally, benchmarking is likely to become increasingly 
important.  
•  While countries such as the US, Australia or Japan develop cap-and-
trade systems, initial allocation – such as in the EU – is likely to be for 
free. It is argued that benchmarking offers the prospect of fairness, 
effectiveness and efficiency. Existing experiences with benchmarking 
in Japan, the EU and member states could prove valuable for policy 
design in other countries.  
•  Benchmarks are likely to become useful tools for managing the 
transition to a low-carbon economy by, for example, helping industry 
to identify technology or performance opportunities, or providing 
information on best practice and how to achieve it. The Asia-Pacific 
Partnership has been focusing on this in a limited number of 
countries. Increasingly, emerging economies are interested in 
benchmarks for their domestic climate-change and low-carbon 
development strategies. Benchmarks can work even in the absence of 
a carbon price. Improved performance can reduce GHG emissions 
and energy consumption and therefore has a low payback period 
from the perspective of both a company and a government.  
•  At the level of international climate-change negotiations, there are 
equally numerous areas where benchmarks may play a role. To name 
but some, sectoral crediting, the sectoral Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), the development of monitoring, reporting and 
verification rules and standards, the comparability of effort among 
parties, the comparability of efforts among sectors or the setting of 
party or sector caps.  
Benchmarks can create transparency, reinforce predictability and 
possibly allow for ‘transposability’ from an industry in one country to 
another. Ultimately, benchmarking could prove to be an asset for the global 
climate-change agenda while being beneficial for (well-performing) 
industry, especially in the absence of a robust carbon price signal. There 
might even be a possibility to ‘transfer’ the EU or parts of the EU 
benchmarking exercise internationally. 
Against this background, the EU ETS benchmarking exercise has 
additional importance beyond allocation; ‘getting it right’, i.e. developing 
benchmarks in a pragmatic, practical and fair way within this very tight 
time frame could be crucial to how benchmarks will be perceived within 
the EU and externally.  4 | INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
 
This CEPS Task Force Report addresses EU-specific questions as well 
as issues that are relevant to the global discussions. Written for a non-
specialist audience, it simultaneously attempts to clarify what benchmarks 
are and what potential they hold for both the domestic and international 
discussions. It includes definitions and a description of historical 
experiences. Central to the report, however, are the EU-specific questions 
related to EU ETS benchmark-based allocation.  
Chapter 1 presents definitions, reviews the history of benchmarks 
and draws some tentative lessons for the EU ETS. It also forms an 
introduction to benchmarking for non-experts.  
Chapter 2 analyses in some depth a selection of the principal 
controversial topics that are currently being debated among the EU, 
member states and stakeholders. Topics include i) principles, ii) 
identification of the 10% most efficient, iii) competitiveness, iv) intra-
sectoral product substitutability, v) design options to incentivise GHG 
reductions, vi) benchmarks and technology development, vii) market 
visibility, viii) inter-sectoral allocation issues, and ix) data collection and 
measurement systems.  
Chapter 3 briefly reviews existing initiatives outside the EU and 
Europe before chapter 4 offers short concluding remarks. 
The report is completed with a number of boxes and appendices. For 
more technical analysis it often makes reference to the analysis of Ecofys et 
al. (2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d and 2009e).  
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1.  BENCHMARKS AND BENCHMARKING: 
DEFINITIONS AND EXPERIENCES 
enchmarks and benchmarking are widely used terms in many 
different circumstances, entailing some sort of comparison of 
performance based on agreed indicators. Typically this leads to some 
form of ranking or scoreboards. Such benchmarking can be used to assess 
the performance of governments (national, regional, local, agencies or 
government services), within industry to compare the performance of 
different business divisions or between companies and installations. 
Therefore, indicators may be as diverse as profitability, human resource 
satisfaction and the number of accidents, as well as energy and resource 
efficiency and emissions per unit of output – the subject matter of this 
report.  
1.1  Application of benchmarks  
This report understands benchmarking broadly as the ‘comparison of the 
performance of industry’ against an agreed set of indicators. There is a 30-
year history of industrial benchmarking, starting in the US refining sector, 
which has led to the development of the Solomon index (see Box 1.1). The 
origins of benchmarking, i.e. the Solomon index, involve a data comparison 
of large processes (costs, production efficiency, maintenance and energy 
consumption) as a tool for evaluating installations in an economic way. 
This evaluation, while respecting confidentiality, is expressed in a ranking 
that allows an objective comparison, because it is based on agreed criteria. 
Typically, a recognised international consultant collects data from all the 
participating industries, using a validated method. This comparison has 
been designed as a tool for managers for taking business and investment 
decisions. Soon after the refinery work, Solomon also developed 
benchmarking for crackers. Other benchmark consultants exist, such as 
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Phillip Townsend Associates Inc., Plant Surveys International and the 
Process Design Center. 
Although not a benchmark programme, the “Getting the Numbers 
Right” (GNR) work under the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) of the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a similar 
exercise. It collects data on agreed parameters that would eventually allow 
evaluation of the performance of installations both within a continent and 
between continents, yet respecting confidentiality.  
Benchmarking is also being undertaken by the International 
Aluminium Institute (IAI) for a number of key indicators such as safety, 
energy use or GHG emissions. The performance of all the reporting 
installations is plotted against the performance of all other (de-identified) 
installations in the same class. In this way, installations can see the current 
best level of performance they could achieve. This allows installations to be 
compared with the best performers. At industry level, it is hoped that 
industry improves its collective performance through the sharing of 
information among peers, while maintaining the confidentiality of facility 
data.  
Box 1.1 The Solomon index 
CONCAWE, a European association of oil companies, started working in 
2008 on behalf of the European refining sectors on a methodology to 
characterise refinery CO2 emissions in anticipation of the finalisation of the 
ETS Directive. Refiners have experience with Solomon Associates for more 
than 25 years, so CONCAWE naturally turned to them to adapt their 
existing energy and CO2 emission measures to the needs of the ETS 
Directive. Below is a brief history of the Solomon experience. 
  HSB Solomon Associates LLC (Solomon) conducted its first Fuels 
Refinery Performance Analysis  (Fuels Study) of approximately 45 US 
refineries in 1980. Study participation and the resulting database have 
grown substantially since then. Solomon now conducts the Fuels Study on a 
regional basis, with separate studies for the following areas: 
•  North and South America 
•  Europe, Africa, and the Middle East 
•  Asia/Pacific/Indian Ocean  
  More than 350 refineries, which make up approximately 85% of 
worldwide capacity, were benchmarked in the 2008 Fuels and Lube Studies. 
Solomon’s proprietary database includes detailed data on more than 500 
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Box 1.1 cont’d 
In addition to improving the statistical validity of study results, the 
database’s growth has enabled Solomon to continually improve its study 
design and data validation techniques. Since the mid-1990s, the database 
has supported an analysis of refinery performance that extends far beyond 
simple benchmarking. 
Solomon’s refinery efficiency methodologies are the standard within 
the worldwide refining industry. 
Top performing Solomon Fuels Study participants use Solomon’s 
Energy Intensity Index (EII®) as the definitive metric for assessing the 
energy efficiency of the overall refinery and the individual process units on 
a daily basis. 
Building upon the credibility and broad acceptance of EII, Solomon 
adopted the EII concept to greenhouse gases (GHG) with the development 
of the Carbon Emissions Intensity (CEI™) metric in 2003. CEI is a complex 
and proprietary GHG benchmarking methodology that refiners use to drive 
internal GHG emissions improvement efforts. 
CEI lacks the simplicity and transparency needed in regulatory and 
compliance conversations. Solomon responded to the request of Fuels Study 
participants need for simple, credible and transparent GHG metrics by 
developing Solomon’s Complexity Weighted Barrels (CWB™) 
methodology. CWB, or its metric variation “complexity weighted tonne” 
(CWT), is being promoted in multiple world regions for use in developing 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity metrics and allocation 
methodologies.* 
The Solomon performance metrics have thus become widely accepted 
within the industry as important measures of relative performance. Indeed, 
many have incorporated the metrics into their own continuous performance 
analysis.  
CONCAWE agreed to buy the rights to adapt and use the Solomon 
CWB/CWT approach for the ETS Directive and the methodology has now 
been reviewed and recommended as suitable by Ecofys, the Commission’s 
consultants on benchmarking. 
 
Note:  Refer to the following link for the proper use of Solomon’s marks: 
http://solomononline.com/intellectual-property/. 
Source: Contribution by EUROPIA. 
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Yet, ‘benchmarking’ does not yet define ‘benchmarks’. Benchmarks 
are performance measures based on agreed parameters and verification, i.e. 
verified metrics. Benchmarks do not need to be set at the highest level of 
performance. It is up to the users (industry or policy-makers) to derive 
benchmarks serving their specific objectives. Benchmarks and benchmark 
methodologies will vary, depending on their use (see Box 1.2).  
Benchmarking in a generic way, i.e. used to compare performance of 
installations, has played a role in a number of different areas – such as 
identifying opportunities for improvement, helping to distinguish and 
eventually transfer best practices or measuring advances in enhancing 
performance. From a company perspective, benchmarking can (indirectly) 
provide a stimulus to improve performance. This has been the case for 
example for the Solomon index (Box 1.1). Benchmarking methodologies 
used to compare the performance of installations can also be used in 
comparing sector efforts as this specific application reveals the best 
available (proven) technologies, provided the benchmark is based on 
practical benchmarks – using real data – as opposed to theoretical ones. 
Benchmarking can be used for not only comparing various targets at 
the country, sector or installation level but also for setting a cap in a 
bottom-up fashion or in calculating the carbon content to establish the 
carbon footprint.  
This application differs again from a regulatory scheme in which 
installations are required to achieve an absolute or specific (i.e. relative) 
target. Here the level of benchmarks set the goal and therefore will tend to 
converge on the best available technology. In regulatory schemes, 
installations are forced to achieve a certain objective but there is no 
additional incentive to go beyond.  
Benchmarks do not reveal emerging technologies as they are based 
on existing technologies.  
Benchmark-based allocation is a different matter. The benchmark 
here is also a tool to measure performance and achieve a ‘fair’ distribution 
of burden. But benchmarks used for allocation in themselves do not provide 
incentives to improve performance. This stems from the CO2 price under 
the EU ETS. As all installations receive the same amount of allocations – 
based on the benchmark – the efficient installation will need to buy fewer 
than the inefficient. Furthermore, benchmarks add value by avoiding 
possible perverse incentives related to the ‘updating’ problem of historical 
grandfathering. Under historical grandfathering, those companies that BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 9 
 
have reduced emissions receive fewer allowances in the next phase, as their 
emissions are lower.  
For allocation purposes, there is a need to multiply the benchmark by 
an activity rate to establish the total number of allowances. This could be 
based on recent or forecasted production, standard load factors or historical 
production levels. The activity rate can contain a margin of error if it is 
based on some kind of justifiable estimation or business plan.  
Box 1.2 Different applications of benchmarks 
Benchmarks can be used 
•  for free allocation in a cap-and-trade system (e.g. in the EU ETS for 
allocation to industry post-2012; for allocation to new entrants in the EU 
ETS phases I and II); 
•  as a regulatory scheme, such as setting an absolute or relative emissions 
or performance target to be achieved (e.g. the Energy Efficiency 
Benchmarking Covenant in the Netherlands (1999) and Flanders (2003), 
the Japanese target to improve energy efficiency by 1% annually); 
•  for setting a sectoral or national GHG emissions cap in a bottom-up 
fashion, ensuring that targets are doable domestically (e.g. the Japanese 
national target proposed by then Prime Minister Taro Aso in June 2009); 
•  for judging ‘comparability’ – however it is defined – among national or 
sectoral targets; 
•  for establishing the level of carbon credits that a project can obtain under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms or the post-2012 period (e.g. 
CDM, sectoral CDM or sectoral crediting);  
•  for comparing the carbon content of imported products with the 
benchmark in the case of border measures (e.g. the obligation for 
importers to buy allowances if production has not been covered by a 
carbon price); and 
•  as a tool for evaluating and comparing the performance of installations 
in terms of economic or environmental performance with the aim of 
improving performance (e.g. Solomon index, “Getting the Numbers 
Right”, the IAI’s Global Performance Data, the World Steel Association’s 
Global CO2 Data Collection Methodology, the initial Japanese 
benchmarking schemes focused on fair evaluation of energy efficiency 
improvements in industry consistent with international developments 
and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate).  10 | BENCHMARKS AND BENCHMARKING: DEFINITIONS AND EXPERIENCES 
 
1.2  Essential elements for benchmarking  
There is significant experience in the EU and member states with 
benchmarking.  
In the context of implementing the IPPC Directive (96/61/EC, 
codified in Directive 2008/1/EC), the EU developed so-called ‘best 
available techniques’ reference documents (BREFs).  
In phases I and II of the EU ETS, member states used benchmarking 
in setting the allocation, which was done mainly for new entrants – 
although other member states had already used it for existing installations 
– and principally in the second phase. For instance, the application of 
benchmarking to N2O allocations in the EU ETS originated in the 
Netherlands.  
The most comprehensive application has been the development of the 
Energy Efficiency Benchmarking Covenant in the Netherlands (1999) and 
Flanders (2003). These particular experiences have helped identify possible 
key elements for successful benchmarks (see Box 1.3). 
Box 1.3 Key elements for successful EU ETS benchmarks 
•  Built upon existing benchmarking schemes 
•  An independent consultant is involved (preferably own initiative) 
•  All input data are gathered directly from participants 
•  A regular participants’ conference is held 
•  A sufficient number of participants is attained (> 50% sector volume) 
•  Geographical coverage is adequate 
Source: Adapted from a presentation by E. van Efferink, “Lessons from 
Benchmarking: Experience from the Netherlands”, third meeting of the 
CEPS Task Force on “Benchmarking for the EU ETS and Beyond”, 
CEPS, Brussels, 10 September 2009. 
There is no broadly accepted definition of the technical content or 
method for how to derive benchmarks for the purpose of energy or CO2 
efficiency policy. In reality, benchmarks may be derived from various 
sources. These could be practical measurements, theoretical calculations, 
arbitrary targets or the literature. The former is the most accurate, yet also 
the most complex to establish, while especially the latter is generally an BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 11 
 
unreliable and non-transparent source as the origin is not always known 
and margins are often used. There is now a consensus among benchmark 
consultants that benchmarks are best based on real measurement of 
performance, thus generating the performance curve.  
These experiences have yielded a number of lessons in several areas, 
as outlined below.  
Developing benchmarks. A precondition for a benchmark is an 
inventory of the products (and processes if applicable) to be benchmarked, 
taking into account that the benchmarking method, boundaries, random 
conditions, problems, solutions and verification need to be laid out.  
The Energy Efficiency Benchmarking Covenant has used the 
industrial benchmarking method by setting benchmarks based on the 
highest performance in the best decile,4 requiring that the installations be 
improved to reach the benchmark. Fallback positions in cases where a ‘full 
benchmark’ has not been possible have been ‘best practice’, where the 
Covenant has required achieving a performance of +10% compared with 
the world best, or theoretical benchmarks. Fallbacks are easy for (simple 
and standardised) energy conversion such as boilers, power stations or 
even combined heat and power (CHP). They are very difficult for final 
energy consumers (industrial processes), especially if one aims at reaching 
a level playing field for all participants.  
Complexity also increases with the number of participants and in 
cases where the same products are made by different raw materials in a 
varying balance or where processes produce more than one product at the 
same time. Experience suggests that benchmarks in principle can be avoided 
for most products but not necessarily for all intermediate products, such as 
paper and pulp manufacturing (for details, see Ecofys et al., 2009a, pp. 27-
34).  
Generally speaking, CO2 benchmarking is more difficult than that for 
energy. On the other hand, the ETS work is facilitated by only including 
direct emissions. Still, difficulties start if direct emissions can be replaced 
by indirect ones, e.g. in cases where energy carriers are interchangeable. 
For example, glass furnaces can be and are heated by fuel (natural gas or 
                                                      
4 This is not to be confused with the average performance of the 10% most efficient 
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oil) or electricity. In crackers, process compressors can be and are driven by 
turbines (heat), gas turbines (natural gas) or electric motors. Drying in a 
polymer manufacturing process is done with natural gas, steam or even 
electricity (for details, see Ecofys et al., 2009e).  
Experiences from previous benchmarking exercises have been that 
benchmarking can always be done, irrespective of how complex it is. 
Establishing benchmarks can be time consuming, especially when setting 
them up for the first time. This has similarly been experienced in the case of 
the BREFs developed under the IPPC Directive. 
Depending on the overall complexity, there is a rationale for focusing 
on the major emitting product when developing benchmarks. For example, 
in the ETS phase I, around 7% of the installations were responsible for 80% 
of all emissions. Some 7,400 (small) installations of a total of 10,280 5 
installations accounted for around 5% of emissions.  
The development of benchmarks can face a number of additional 
challenges that are discussed in chapter 2 (for details, see also Ecofys et al., 
2009a).  
•  The area of CHP in sectors other than the power-generation sector 
necessitates a decision on a distribution key – essentially about how 
to deal with the export of electricity, i.e. electricity that is not 
consumed onsite and the treatment of contractual requirements with 
the grid operator (even in the case of a breakdown of production, the 
installation might be required to produce power with the steam being 
let off). 
•  The determination of the 10% most efficient has brought to attention 
the matter of how to deal with ‘outliers’, i.e. the possible exclusion of 
certain installations because of so-called ‘non-reproducible random 
conditions’ such as a unique heat-recovery opportunity nearby, the 
availability of renewable energy or CHP.  
•  Benchmarking is also complicated in cases where too few 
installations are included in a sector or sub-sector.  
                                                      
5  See e.g. the European Commission’s press release, “Emissions trading: 2007 
verified emissions from EU ETS businesses”, IP/08/787, 23.08.2008 on its website 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/787).  BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 13 
 
•  Product benchmarks do not always fit the sub-sector division, 
because in many cases a sector produces several products, and some 
use recycled materials while others do not.  
•  Finally, lack of product uniformity can also render the determination 
more difficult. Benchmarks are relatively easy for uniform processes, 
for example in the case of ammonia. Yet problems can arise for 
instance in textile finishing or propylene. These can be produced 
from either product streams by purification in refineries, which 
requires little energy, or in crackers, which is far more energy-
intensive (see Ecofys et al., 2009e).  
Data collection and availability. Data availability and collection as well 
as the reliability of data have been overarching concerns in all previous 
benchmarking exercises. Data from existing literature statistics have not 
always been useful, especially for specific emissions and load factors. 
Ultimately, it is essential that the series of data for the benchmark value are 
consistent and reliable, especially with regard to process boundaries and 
related issues such as the scope of the ETS or process outsourcing. The lack 
of transparency could undermine the system and provoke litigation. 
Acceptance can be a problem as industry cooperation is necessary to 
develop practical benchmarks. In the case of EU ETS allocation, this risk is 
reduced given that the alternatives to benchmark-based allocation appear 
far less acceptable to governments, business and other stakeholders. 
Grandfathering – with some sort of improvement factor – does not reward 
efficient installations or early movers, and has been shown to have a strong 
potential to distort competition within the internal market and may not be 
acceptable to governments. Auctioning – the other principal alternative – 
does away with free allowances altogether. This approach, it can be argued, 
has provided sufficient incentives for industry to engage in the 
benchmarking process. Companies accept that free allocation requires some 
system of benchmarks if the level playing field is to be preserved. As a 
result, ETS participants tend to accept benchmarks even if not every ETS 
participant agrees that they are 100% correct. Further inducements to 
accept benchmarks are provided by the possibility to create a theoretical 
instead of a practical benchmark.  
Verification. Good data depends on good measurement systems 
(measurement, reporting and verification, or MRV), which might or might 
not be there. Any benchmarking process inevitably needs verification, a 
highly technological process. The development of MRV can be complex, 14 | BENCHMARKS AND BENCHMARKING: DEFINITIONS AND EXPERIENCES 
 
especially if it requires a high level of accuracy. This is especially true if the 
benchmarks are on products. A new benchmarking process needs to 
develop procedures and accumulate knowledge about different industrial 
processes. In previous benchmarking exercises, one of the initial problems 
has been the lack of independence of the verifiers. Most of these challenges 
have disappeared for the ETS in its third phase as MRV methodologies and 
procedures are well established and codified, and highly experienced 
verifiers are now available. Therefore, the availability of robust and verified 
data by and large is no longer a major issue for ETS benchmark-based 
allocation. It is nonetheless an emerging issue for some areas, for example 
for the measurement of heat and for waste gases from steel production for 
electricity generation and downstream processes.  
It has been argued that costs can quickly accrue in benchmarking. 
This risk can be mitigated by keeping the numbers of benchmarks limited 
but also by keeping benchmarks practical and simple to the extent possible. 
Cost can be broken down into i) the definition of the benchmarks, ii) data 
collection and iii) the running costs for MRV. According to Schyns (2005, p. 
10), the cost of defining the benchmarks in the Dutch Covenant has been 
around €20,000 to €40,000 per benchmark, usually to be paid by several 
companies. This would amount to less than €0.01 per tonne of CO2 of the 
Dutch total number of allowances for the first EU ETS trading period. This 
has been the figure for operating with existing benchmarks. For entirely 
new benchmarks the costs are much higher, depending on the desired 
accuracy in relation to the economic impact. The typical costs for a new 
benchmark, as currently needed for the EU ETS because the benchmarks 
are now CO2 benchmarks, will be around €100,000 for the consultancy 
work. With a lot of preparatory work done in the Dutch and Flemish 
Benchmarking Covenant as well as in phases I and II of the EU ETS, the 
costs are likely to be lower. The most significant costs are running costs for 
MRV. Still, these are not a direct result of benchmarking but of the fact that 
GHG emissions are related, i.e. they would also occur for another 
regulatory scheme. Data collection costs can be significant as well but as 
Solomon and other benchmarking exercises show, such data can provide 
useful indicators for company managers to improve the performance of 
installations.  
Developing benchmarks for allocation. Allocation requires both a 
benchmark and an activity rate. While a benchmark can be set in an 
accurate (based on an agreed methodology), transparent and verified way, BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 15 
 
there remains a margin of error for the activity rate, which is based on some 
kind of justifiable estimation including historical production or a business 
plan.  
Production in the benchmarking formula can be introduced in 
diverse ways. One option is to consider the production capacity times a 
standard load factor for the sector. Although this simple method is a 
common one for new entrants’ allocations, the application of it to 
incumbents has some disadvantages. It introduces an unequal 
consideration of the characteristics strongly affecting the load factor, such 
as the age or the role of the installation. A more conservative option is to 
use historical production corrected with projections, introducing sector and 
country-specific growth factors.  
In the EU ETS, historical production is proposed and has been used 
in the past as a proxy for an activity rate of incumbent installations. The 
justification was that historical production generally reflects installation 
features, and if applied long enough and without changes in capacity, 
historical series guarantee a representative outlook of future production for 
the specific installation. The assumption of this option is that the main 
production growth in the medium term will be from new entrants.  
Some experts challenge benchmarks that entail historical production6 
on the basis that there can be very large variations of production by 
incumbents in a short period.7  They argue that although in a five-year 
period most or all of the production growth is probably related to capacity 
increases by existing installations, this might not be addressed by 
allocations from a new entrants’ reserve because of the application of 
capacity-extension thresholds. Such ‘capacity creep’ has been witnessed 
especially in the steel, chemical and refining sectors, and more generally in 
process industries including the food industry.  
                                                      
6 See for example, Schyns and Loske (2008).  
7 See for example, Entec UK Ltd and NERA Economic Consulting (2005), which 
found significant variations in the production of incumbents in only six years.  
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2.  IMPLICATIONS FOR EU ETS 
ALLOCATION 
his chapter discusses the main issues surrounding benchmarks 
related to allocation in the EU ETS. The analysis is based on 
experiences from allocation in phases I and II, as well as previous 
exercises in as much as relevant.  
2.1  The crucial role of allocation principles  
Some of the key parameters for allocation have been written down in the 
EU ETS Directive. These include the choice of the activity rate, that 
benchmarks should be used only where deemed feasible or that allocation 
will be determined ex ante, and that the starting point is the 10% most 
efficient installations in (sub-)sectors. Moreover, allocation must take into 
account among other factors the most efficient techniques, high efficiency 
cogeneration, efficient energy use of waste gases and CCS.  
This report has identified a number of ‘ground rules’, such as i) the 
avoidance of damage to competitiveness, ii) equal treatment of all sectors 
whether exposed to carbon leakage or not, iii) equal treatment of all 
installations in a (sub-)sector without differentiation according to their 
actual CO2 efficiency, iv) transparency (also for the non-specialist), and v) 
practical and pragmatic (not perfect) approaches. Especially the latter 
principle has been reiterated several times.  
Allocation will need to deal with tradeoffs and will eventually entail 
the implementation of hard choices8 for the EU. Because benchmarks will 
                                                      
8 The Ecofys and Fraunhofer ISI (2009) report identifies in the summary (pp. iii-iv) 
the following choices in relation to benchmark-based allocation: the number of 
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affect the distribution of allowances among installations within sectors 
(intra-sectoral allocation), as well as among sectors (inter-sectoral 
allocation), political tensions are inevitable. To ensure political 
acceptability, a high level of transparency and a fair degree of 
predictability, it will be important to spell out the overall objectives of 
allocation. This should also keep the discussions focused, avoiding a 
situation whereby allocation rules are twisted towards special interests.9  
Agreement on allocation principles is equally important to guide 
allocation in cases where a benchmark is not feasible, i.e. where a fallback 
rule will need to be applied. While a fallback rule will always create 
difficulties in comparing the actual allocation between installations with 
and without a benchmark, adherence to the principles should avoid 
significant differences in treatment. Moreover, the formulation of allocation 
principles should also ensure that the ultimate objective, reducing GHG 
emissions in a “cost-effective and economically efficient manner“(European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 63), will be 
achieved.  
Previously, a number of principles have been identified, for example 
by Ecofys and Fraunhofer ISI (2009, p. iv), as outlined in Box 2.1. 
Box 2.1 Possible allocation principles to serve as the basis for a benchmark-based 
allocation methodology 
1.  Base the benchmark level on the most energy-efficient technology.* 
2.  Do not use technology-specific benchmarks for technologies producing the 
same product.  
3.  Do not differentiate between existing and new plants. 
                                                                                                                                       
products to distinguish; the emissions from electricity use to which the benchmark 
relates (i.e. only direct emissions or also the indirect emissions); the benchmark for 
the specific energy consumption for a certain product; the benchmark for the fuel 
mix that is used to produce a certain product; the inclusion of correction factors, 
such as the different technologies used or the size of the installation; and the 
production (activity) levels that are used to convert the benchmarks (specific 
emission per unit of production) to an absolute emission allowance.  
9 Please see also Ecofys et al. (2009a), which has attempted to link each option to 
the allocation principles.  18 | IMPLICATIONS FOR EU ETS ALLOCATION 
 
Box 2.1 cont’d 
4.  Do not apply corrections for plant age, plant size, raw material quality or 
climatic circumstances. 
5.  Only use separate benchmarks for different products if verifiable 
production data are available based on unambiguous and justifiable 
product classifications. 
6.  Use separate benchmarks for intermediate products if these products are 
traded between installations. 
7.  Do not use fuel-specific benchmarks for individual installations or for 
installations in specific countries. 
8.  Take technology-specific fuel choices into account in determining 
benchmarks. 
9.  Use historical production to allocate allowances for existing installations. 
10. Use product-specific capacity utilisation rates in combination with 
verifiable capacity data to allocate allowances to new installations. 
11.  Use a heat production benchmark combined with a generic efficiency-
improvement factor for heat consumption in processes where no output-
based benchmark is developed. 
* This principle was dropped by Ecofys et al. (2009a, p. 28) to reflect the final 
version of the revised EU ETS Directive. 
Source: Ecofys and Fraunhofer ISI (2009, p. iv). 
2.2  Considerations for identifying the ‘10% most efficient’  
The EU ETS Directive requires that the starting points for the benchmarks 
are set at the level of the “average performance of the 10% most efficient10 
installations” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2009, p. 73). This has a number of implications and consequences. First, 
benchmarks will need to be practical – as opposed to theoretical – and 
based on measurements and a conceptually-sound benchmarking 
methodology. Second, this approach achieves a level playing field for all 
sectors, provided that the benchmarks are assessed with sufficient quality 
and proper verification. Third, sectors where the minimum/maximum 
                                                      
10  The study by Ecofys et al. (2009a) considers this to mean the “most GHG 
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span is high will on average have a stronger incentive to reduce emissions 
than those where this span is lower. Fourth, as in all benchmarking 
exercises, the potential of emerging technology is not covered. Inclusion of 
this aspect would require scientific input, which goes beyond the scope of 
benchmark-based allocation. Similarly, for the most part the potential of 
product change is not covered. 
Politically most difficult is the possible exclusion of certain 
installations because of so-called ‘non-reproducible random conditions’ 
(such as a unique heat-recovery opportunity nearby, the availability of 
renewable energy or CHP), i.e. outliers.11  The decision of including or 
excluding outliers, more specifically very efficient installations, may have a 
significant impact on the level of the benchmark. For instance, a spread 
factor of 2 of all benchmarked installations – an extremely good figure, 
which might not be achieved by most if not all sectors12 – would mean that 
the worst performer only receives half of the allowances that it would need. 
In the event that there are limited or only very costly possibilities for 
upgrading, if the installation is very emissions-intensive it may even have 
to close. This may be in line with the introduction of a carbon price, the 
application of the polluter-pays principle and the ETS objective of reducing 
emissions, notably from the less-efficient plants, but causes concern about 
carbon leakage (see Box 2.2). Especially the steel, aluminium and refining 
industries have highlighted the difficulty of identifying the 10% most 
efficient because of the heterogeneity of the installations (see also Ecofys et 
al. 2009c and 2009d). A particular example of the broad heterogeneity of 
installations is the EU refining sector, with some 110 EU refineries ranging 
from 2 to 20 million tonnes of output, with variations in the product 
output.  
To address complex ‘co-production’ processes, Solomon has 
developed the complexity weighted tonne (CWT) parameter to represent 
the total production of a particular refinery. The single, common 
                                                      
11 A big spread factor of the performance of installations per se does not necessarily 
mean non-reproducible random conditions. It could equally mean that many 
inefficient installations with inefficient technological choices operate. Only if the 
spread factor is the result of unique and non-reproducible conditions can exclusion 
be justified.  
12 Refineries worldwide have a spread factor of 5. 20 | IMPLICATIONS FOR EU ETS ALLOCATION 
 
‘production’ parameter CWT has been reviewed and endorsed by 
CONCAWE and is applicable to virtually all EU refineries across the 27 EU 
member states, and thus most EU refineries are included (see Box 1.1; see 
also Ecofys et al., 2009d). It takes into account the product mix produced by 
each refinery, reduces competitive distortion and the complexity of using 
several parameters. The alternative to a high spread factor could only be an 
alternative allocation methodology (‘grandfathering’).  
Determination of the 10% most efficient installations can also be 
rendered difficult owing to a lack of product uniformity. For example, this 
can be the case for different oil qualities. Another example pertains to the 
differences that arise from variations in emissions from re-melting, which 
has an overall environmental gain from a lifecycle perspective in having 
much lower emissions than the production of the virgin product. Hence, 
the average of the 10% most efficient installations could well be the re-
melting. This can be a reason for a separate benchmark. 
Box 2.2 Aluminium case study 
A.  Outliers for alumina plants 
I. There are only five major operating alumina plants in the EU, with one recently 
closed. One of them is based on a different technology for hydrate 
production, which leads to clearly lower emissions than the four other plants. 
This alternative technology was considered experimental at the time it 
was built in 1972, and still today out of seventy alumina refineries worldwide, 
only two plants use it (one in Europe and one in Australia). 
All other plants built in Europe since then have used traditional 
technology. The main reasons are that (a) it was not considered proven 
technology (the Australian plant also experienced a long period of operating 
problems at the time of launch), (b) it is technically more complicated and 
requires highly qualified operators, and (c) it requires higher investments. 
This technology being fundamentally different from the regular 
technologies in use for hydrate production, it is not feasible to convert 
existing plants to it without demolishing and rebuilding major parts of the 
plant.  
II. Another consideration for the benchmark is the fuel use. Most plants have access 
to gas. However, two plants use fuel oil as there is no gas network close to 
their locations and consequently no possibility to switch to gas. Using a 
benchmark based on gas only would lead to increased costs and the closure of 
the two plants with no access to gas. BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 21 
 
 
Box 2.2 cont’d 
The calculation of the economic impact of both cases is as follows:  
•  If the lowest emitting plant was set as the benchmarks, the total cost for 
the remaining plants would be about €45 million per year (CO2 at   
€30/t). 
•  If the heat production and fuel mix benchmarks were used as fallback 
solutions, the cost for two plants with only oil available would be about 
€12-14 million per year for each. 
 
Two proposals for a fallback position: 
•  To consider the lowest operating plant as an outlier based on the fact 
that it was not a fully proven technology at the time when the European 
plants were built and still is not the chosen technology for new plants. 
•  Set a fallback heat benchmark for the hydrate production and fuel mix 
benchmark for calcination based on gas, but for the plants with no gas 
availability set a benchmark based on fuel oil with the provision of 
reverting to a gas benchmark when gas becomes available. 
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Box 2.2 cont’d 
B. Recycling  activities 
The recycling of aluminium consists of refining and re-melting metal scrap 
in order to produce new metal, using a large variety of different quality 
input materials and finishing operations. Recycling can be done without any 
loss of quality and requires much less energy than the production of primary 
metal (i.e. from bauxite). 
Recycling plants can use fossil fuels – in most plants, gas – or 
electricity for the melting and finishing operations. However, once a plant is 
built, switching from one technology to the other is not possible, unless the 
facility is completely refurbished. 
The energy consumption is also different between re-melting plants, 
based mainly on clean scrap, and refining plants based mainly on post-
consumer scrap as the treatment required is different. 
Benchmark curves for direct emissions could be dominated by the 
most electricity-intensive instead of the most energy-efficient installations. 
The construction of any benchmark needs to take this fact into account, so as 
environmentally beneficial processes, such as aluminium recycling, are not 
discouraged. 
It has therefore been a proposed solution for these plants to use a fuel-
mix fallback position due to the large variety of raw materials, finishing 
operations and different products produced. 
Source: Contribution by Alcoa and Hydro with no revision or significant editing 
by the rapporteurs. For more information, see www.alcoa.com and 
www.hydro.com. 
 
2.3  Impact on competitiveness  
One of the reasons for applying benchmarks has been the actual or 
perceived advantage for the competitiveness of European industry. The EU 
ETS Directive has chosen to address competitiveness through the free 
allocation of allowances (up to the benchmark). It is the use of ex ante 
benchmark-based allocation that makes such free allocation possible 
without distorting competition while rewarding the efficient. Benchmark-
based allocation will not necessarily stop any change in production 
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patterns. But it is a way to offset the increased costs for industry and may 
act as an incentive to continue producing in the EU during the period 
covered.  
The objectives of the EU ETS cap-and-trade system have been to 
create incentives for companies to reduce emissions in the most cost-
effective way, to reward carbon efficiency and to foster new and innovative 
approaches to reducing emissions. The incentive for efficient abatement 
arises from the ‘opportunity cost’ of using allowances. Passing through the 
GHG costs in the form of an allowance price will create a consumer 
incentive to reduce the use of GHG-intensive goods. At the same time, it 
will increase producers’ cash flow to invest in abatement technologies. The 
price signal will be distorted, however, if GHG costs cannot be passed 
through domestically or globally. In this case, the market structure, 
especially the price elasticity of demand, inhibits the ability of globally 
trading industries to pass through fully or even partially. As a result, 
(European and global) product prices will not reflect the opportunity costs 
of allowances and therefore the EU cost of carbon. For example, if firms in a 
European industry cannot pass through the allowance price partly or fully, 
they eventually end up ‘paying’ for the costs of the allowance price. Failure 
to pass through would erode benefits from CO2  abatement as well as 
producers’ competitiveness, transfer allowance value abroad and 
ultimately lead to carbon leakage.  
Free allocation addresses this. It constitutes compensation or as some 
argue, a subsidy,13 potentially creating an incentive to continue producing 
in Europe. The amount of the compensation or subsidy is set by the level of 
the benchmark. This is also where the level of the benchmark matters for 
competitiveness.  
Yet, even if the additional costs in an industry were 100% 
compensated by either free allowances or higher revenues or both, 14 free 
                                                      
13 A subsidy is generally defined as a benefit usually given by the government to 
groups or individuals generally in the form of a cash payment or tax reduction. 
The subsidy is typically given to remove some kind of burden and is often 
considered to be in the interest of the public. 
14  Allocating the majority of the CO2 allowances for free, combined with the 
potential of industries to pass a smaller or larger share of the costs on to consumers, 
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allocation per se may not fully prevent industries in global competition 
from shifting their production, and thereby emissions, abroad. The reason 
is that production decisions are not based on average industry margins, but 
on marginal costs for the last unit. In practical terms, two effects are at 
work: operational (i.e. reducing production in existing installations) and 
structural (i.e. postponing or abandoning investment or actively pursuing 
divestment). The evaluation of the structural effect depends very much on 
the perspective one takes and the assumptions made about the post-2012 
situation – how fast a global agreement is forged and how it will look. 
Project mechanisms such as the CDM, which can bring down overall 
compliance costs, remain important elements.  
2.4  Intra-sectoral product substitution, system boundaries and 
distributional impacts 
One of the politically most sensitive issues is distributional impacts both 
between and within sectors. This section deals with intra-sectoral 
distribution questions while inter-sectoral implications are covered in 
section 2.8. 
This report has addressed intra-sectoral distributional effects for the 
case of the cement industry. This discussion at the same time highlighted 
the importance of sector boundaries, i.e. how far to go up or downstream 
and the extent to which product substitution should be included in the 
benchmarking exercise. Depending on the production structure in the 
sector, the choice of sector boundary can lead to very important 
distributional consequences. The ETS Directive does not prescribe any view 
on this. At the same time, sector boundaries can also include or exclude 
substitution potential in a given sector. Determining the exact nature of this 
substitution potential will need to be assessed case by case. A crucial 
element in this assessment is the levers to reduce GHG emissions. For 
cement (see also Ecofys, 2009b), there are four principal levers to reduce 
CO2  emissions: energy efficiency, alternative fuels/biomass, clinker 
substitution/blending and CCS (if it exists). 
                                                                                                                                       
limits the economic loss entailed for most industries or can even represent an 
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For the use of benchmarking in national allocation plans for phase I 
and II, Öko Institut and Ecofys (2008; p. 36) analyse a non-exhaustive list of 
NAPs and state,  
various countries have experience with benchmarking in the 
cement industry, of which a few have also used benchmarking as 
an allocation tool during Phase II of the EU ETS (e.g. Germany, 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) in one form or another. 
Most of the MS have referred to the BAT (Best Available 
Technique) level as a basis for the distribution of allowances for 
new entrants. ...Only a small number of MS actually developed 
and presented their benchmarking approach for new entrants. 
Regarding existing plants, an even smaller number of 
member states (Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Poland and in 
Belgium Flanders) decided to use the benchmarking approach for 
the distribution of free allowances to the cement sector. While the 
allocation procedures in the Netherlands built on an energy-
efficiency benchmark (as developed in the national Benchmarking 
Covenant), Germany and the United Kingdom have developed a 
special allocation system based on a GHG benchmark for new 
entrants [‘based on clinker’, rapporteurs’ comment], using correction 
factors in the benchmark. While some of these factors are applied 
using plant-specific data, most of them are standard factors... Some 
other member states have also used “benchmark” type approaches 
for allocation, but a lack of a comprehensive description in the 
NAP made it difficult to provide an accurate description in this 
report. In Italy, the allocation methodology for NAP I for 
incumbents in the cement sector was based on an output-based 
distribution of a predefined cap, equivalent to a clinker-
benchmark. The same output based allocation was applied to new 
entrants. 
The case for a clinker benchmark15 
                                                      
15 Supported by CEMBUREAU and recommended by Ecofys. The decision by the 
CEMBUREAU Board in favour of this clinker benchmark was taken in April 2008 
at a majority of 97.44% of the votes which were cast in full compliance with 
CEMBUREAU governance rules which state that a common position is reached 
when supported by at least 70% of the votes. 26 | IMPLICATIONS FOR EU ETS ALLOCATION 
 
The case recommended by Ecofys,16 which states in their report (Ecofys et al., 
2009b, p. 8), “In particular, based on the...issue [of] clinker trade between 
installations, we conclude that a benchmarking methodology based on clinker 
is the most practical approach for the cement sector” and consists simply of 
calculating a clinker benchmark on the basis of the 10% most efficient 
installation average performance. It does not entail correction factors for 
technologies and moisture content of raw materials.  
This approach is seen by its proponents as most in line with the EU ETS 
directive and the simplest approach. Simplicity is assured through clear 
boundaries, good data and consistency with the ETS Monitoring Guidelines 
(MRG). It is also argued that this approach would provide incentives to reduce 
GHG emissions beyond clinker. This is because, if clinker is substituted in 
cement production, the operator would be able to sell the allowances.  
                                                      
16 Ecofys et al. (2009b; p. 8) state, 
Intermediate products that are traded between installations could be given 
separate benchmarks, because otherwise the allocation to installations producing 
only the intermediate would become very difficult. 
The solutions (conceptually described in table 3 and a bit further discussed in 
Section 4.3 [of Ecofys et al., 2009b]) to solve these practical difficulties in case of 
cement benchmark either result in a hybrid system in which for a single product 
(clinker), two different benchmark methodologies are developed or in a situation 
that a new entity (the company) is introduced in the allocation methodology. [A 
footnote adds that “in addition, the problem of clinker trade between companies would 
not be solved in this methodology”.] Both are not in line with the approach as 
outlined in the report on project approach and general issues.  
We do realize that with clinker benchmarking, clinker substitution is not 
incorporated as such in the benchmarking methodology. Assuming that 
benchmarking will also be applied for the allocation in trading periods after 
2020, clinker benchmarking could give a negative incentive for blending in the 
sense that increased blending could result in lower allowances in the next 
trading period (an update problem). [The added footnote reads as follows “Of course, 
cement benchmarking would also result in a different distribution of initial allowances 
between the various cement companies. As such, the real costs for buying allowances and 
the distribution of these costs over installations and companies will be different than 
with clinker benchmarking.”] Regarding new installations, a clinker benchmark 
could distort incentives to invest in blended cement. However, in view of the 
practical difficulties associated with cement benchmarking (issue 3, 4 and 5) and 
in view of the ambiguity regarding the scope of the amended Directive (1, 2), we 
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Box 2.3 CEMBUREAU’s arguments for a clinker benchmark 
CEMBUREAU is convinced that the clinker benchmark is both most in line 
with the ETS legislation and the best way to create a simple and practical 
benchmark. 
•  CO2 is directly emitted only in the clinker manufacturing process which 
is the activity listed in Annex I (ETD). Therefore, the clinker benchmark 
is in line with the scope of the ETS Directive, as well as the guidelines 
recently issued by the European Commission in its non-paper on 
“Quality and verification criteria for benchmarking data for the EU ETS”. 
•  A clinker benchmark offers a single – simple – EU-wide benchmark. 
•  A clinker benchmark triggers reductions equivalent to those of a cement 
benchmark in terms of clinker to cement ratio. A cement benchmark may 
give the appearance of a CO2 reduction, but it is investment in kiln 
efficient technology that will deliver real emission reductions and energy 
efficiency. In a nutshell, a clinker benchmark rewards early movers in 
terms of technology. 
•  A clinker benchmark does not raise boundary issues as a cement 
benchmark does. A cement benchmark would significantly increase the 
complexity of the ETS with no additional emissions covered and no 
environmental benefit. 
•  The clinker benchmark would not generate complexities or potential 
loopholes in relation to international trade. A cement benchmark would 
allow the bypassing of Article 10a, paragraphs 18 and 19 of the directive 
(no allocation to installations that ceased operation, adjustment of 
allocation to installations that partially cease operation). As the measure 
of activity would be production of cement, producers could simply 
switch to imported clinker and shut down domestic kilns without losing 
allowances. This would obviously be politically unacceptable. 
•  The European Commission’s official policy is to have benchmarks 
calculated based on official CITL data. A clinker benchmark can be 
established on the basis of CITL, whereas a cement benchmark cannot. 
•  A clinker benchmark is fully in line with the Monitoring and Reporting 
Guidelines established by the European Commission. 
•  A clinker benchmark would minimise distortions of competition. A 
cement benchmark would introduce significant distortions of 
competition as the use of additions (slag, fly ashes etc) directly at the 
concrete mixer would not be taken into account under the existing EU-
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Box 2.3 cont’d 
 
 
For more detailed information, please visit www.cembureau.eu. 
Source: Contribution by CEMBUREAU with no revision or significant editing by the 
Rapporteurs. 
 
The case for a cement benchmark 17 
The case for a cement benchmark as advocated by its proponents is based 
on three principal arguments. First, a cement benchmark generally will 
incentivize both energy and CO2 reductions and innovation throughout all 
processes and products because of large sector boundaries. Second, a 
cement benchmark will provide different incentives to improve and 
innovate. Ecofys et al. in their final report (2009b, p. 8) state that “assuming 
that benchmarking will also be applied for the allocation in trading periods 
after 2020, clinker benchmarking could give a negative incentive for 
blending in the sense that increased blending could result in lower 
allowances in the next trading period”. A third argument has been that a 
cement benchmark would improve the reputation of the industry because it 
includes more levers for improvement than clinker. 
 
 
                                                      
17 Supported by Holcim and Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe.  
Where 
should a 
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Box 2.4 Holcim’s arguments for a cement benchmark 
Holcim argues that the cement benchmark will change business-as-usual in 
cement companies whilst providing both environmental and economic 
advantages to the sector. The main reasons/arguments are:  
Cement is within the scope of the ETS Directive: Cement is the core product 
of the cement industry. Customers buy cement, not clinker. Clinker is but an 
intermediate substance used in the production of cement. It is, however, the 
industry’s main source of CO2 emissions. The most effective and least costly 
way to reduce absolute CO2 emissions from the cement sector is by lowering 
the content of clinker in cement during the cement grinding process. Cement 
grinding is a directly associated activity with a significant effect on emissions 
from the cement clinker activity. As such, clinker substitution in cement is 
within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive. 
Benchmarking criteria in Article 10: Cement benchmarking complies with 
each criterion listed in Article 10a (1) of the Directive. Clinker benchmarking, 
however, does not take into account substitutes and alternative production 
processes, nor does it maximize CO2 emissions throughout each production 
process of the sector.   
Environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency: Cement benchmarking 
includes all levers to reduce emissions in the benchmark, such as energy 
efficiency, fuel mix and biomass, clinker substitution, product development 
and consumer choice. That it includes levers that are least costly increases its 
economic efficiency.* As a result, cement benchmarking stimulates research 
and innovation not only in the cement clinker process, but also in cement 
product development and associated applications.  
Leakage: Leakage is a consequence of ex ante allocation and the cost of CO2. 
Excluding the least costly CO2 reduction lever, as in clinker benchmarking, 
increases the risk of leakage. A well-designed cement benchmark takes due 
account of international trade in clinker and cement and does not stimulate 
leakage. 
Feasibility/practicability: A single EU-wide cement benchmarking is feasible: 
all parameters necessary for the benchmarking are identified and defined and 
are already used in the existing EC Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
guidelines. Data are available through the CITL supplemented by the 
installation’s EU ETS reports and the cement industry’s GNR (Getting the 
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Box 2.4 cont’d 
Future orientation: Benchmarking is more than a tool for distributing CO2 
allowances within a trading system. It goes to the fundamental question of 
what the future of the cement industry ought to be and the appropriate CO2 
performance metric for stimulating improvement and innovation. In Holcim’s 
opinion, that metric must capture the full potential for emission reductions in 
our sector. Cement benchmarking is most in line with such long-term view and 
is therefore in the best interest of the industry and the environment in which it 
operates. 
* If two companies produce the same amount of cement but use different levels of clinker, 
the company using less clinker (thus emitting less CO2) to produce the same amount of 
cement will benefit with a cement benchmark. 
For more information, please visit www.holcim.com. 
Source: Contribution by Holcim with no revision or significant editing by the 
Rapporteurs. 
 
2.5  Design options to incentivise the greatest possible emission 
reductions 
Benchmarking as an allocation methodology has been chosen to make free 
allocation possible, notably by avoiding the perverse effects of 
grandfathering and because it has the potential to ensure a non-distorted 
carbon price signal, including the reward of early action and more 
generally carbon efficiency.  
That is why the ETS Directive has mandated “Community-wide ex 
ante benchmarks” (Art. 10a). The same article also prescribes that 
benchmarks are calculated on products rather than inputs, which ensures 
that they solely cover direct emissions and do not reflect different feed 
properties. Another precondition to meet the environmental objective is to 
avoid differentiation according to technologies. A technology-neutral 
benchmark will incentivise the most carbon-efficient product. Technology-
based differentiation would continue to provide incentives for less carbon-
efficient products. The same can be said of correction factors, for example 
for the fuel mix, age or size of the plant. In addition, a proliferation of 
benchmarks or correction factors increases complexity and costs while 
reducing transparency, an important element of a market-based 
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Benchmarking for the purpose of allocation not only requires the 
establishment of a benchmark but also an activity rate with which the 
benchmark will need to be multiplied in order to establish the total number 
of allowances. Theoretically, there is a choice between historical data, 
projections, standard load factors or recent or actual production. Standard 
load factors generally have too high a margin of error and do not represent 
the actual situation. They would in many cases allocate generously to 
inefficient installations. Such inefficiencies go beyond carbon and tend to 
extend to energy consumption and other inputs as well. Nevertheless, they 
could be used for new entrants, which typically will use advanced 
technology, justifying a standard load factor. NAPs for phase I in most 
countries were based on projections. It turned out that most if not all the 
projections were inflated, leading to over-allocation in many sectors. That is 
why historical production data has been seen as a more suitable option. 
The European Commission is considering using the average of 2005–07 
activity data. 
By and large, this approach has arisen out of experiences from NAPs 
for phases I and II some of which were presented to the CEPS Task Force 
and have been the subject of CEPS’ and other research. Lessons learned 
from national experiences include avoiding historical projections for setting 
the activity rate. Historical production has turned out to be the best proxy 
of expected trends, possibly to be adjusted by a standard growth rate if 
appropriate. For exceptional cases, such as deep market restructuring (e.g. 
in the power sector), the Italian NAP has used a pre-determined model.18 
As for new entrants, for which no historical data are available, standard 
load factors can be used.  
2.6  Benchmarks and technology development  
The EU has proposed to reduce its GHG emissions by 30% provided that 
other countries undertake comparable efforts. The current ETS Directive 
addresses only the independent commitment of 20%. It provides for a 
                                                      
18 See C. Di Mambro, “Benchmarking as an allocation method: The experience from 
Italian NAP I and NAP II”, Presentation at the third meeting of the CEPS Task 
Force on “Benchmarking for the EU ETS and Beyond”, CEPS, Brussels, September 
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continuous, annual, linear reduction of 1.74% from 2013 to 2020,19 leading 
to a 21% reduction of covered emissions by 2020 (compared with 2005). 
This continuous linear reduction will persist beyond 2020 when the 
allocation for the third phase finishes, leading to approximately another 
17% reduction from 2020 levels by 2030 (-38% compared with 2005), a 35% 
reduction from 2020 levels by 2040 (56% compared with 2005) and so on.20 
EU member states have supported the objective of reducing their joint 
GHG emissions by somewhere between 80% and 95% by 2050 compared 
with 1990 (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 3). While the 2020 and 
possibly the 2030 targets can and will need to be reached by the 
deployment of existing technologies, beyond that new and breakthrough 
technologies will be required.  
Do benchmarks drive technology? In a regulatory scheme like the 
Dutch and Flemish Benchmarking Covenant, participants have been 
obliged to reach certain targets. Once attained, there has been no additional 
incentive to go beyond, i.e. develop new technologies. The situation is 
different in the EU ETS, where the CO2  price determines the level of 
incentive to improve performance. Emission reductions allow installations 
to sell additional allowances on the market. These incentives could be 
reinforced by two potential effects.  
First, theoretically there would be an incentive to develop new 
technologies if there is expectation that there might be a new benchmark 
for the following period based on a new technology. But this would by no 
means be certain.  
Second, incentives for the development of new technologies may also 
be provided by setting a sufficiently wide sector boundary, as this allows 
for different technological solutions. This would need to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis.  
                                                      
19 The starting point is in fact the average total quantity of allowances for the 2008–
12 period (phase II) and thus the linear reduction begins from the midpoint in 
2010. The final allowance quantity will be adjusted for the inclusion of new sectors 
(e.g. aviation) and for any opt-outs by separate installations.  
20 These are CEPS’ estimates, based on the 1.74% gradient and the 21% reduction 
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2.7  Benchmarks can increase market visibility and enhance 
predictability  
A previous CEPS Task Force Report (Egenhofer and Fujiwara, 2007, p. 15) 
concluded that predictability rather than certainty is a key requirement for 
the EU ETS. There can be no absolute certainty. Uncertainty21 is a normal 
factor for many investment decisions. As aiming at absolute allocation 
certainty is not realistic, what can realistically be achieved is increased 
predictability in the total allocation and the allocation rules for individual 
installations. The former relates to the EU’s and (in some cases) member 
states’ long-term targets, such as the EU ETS linear reduction commitment. 
The latter concerns allocation methodologies. Full auctioning to the power 
sector provides a high degree of predictability. For the industrial sectors, 
benchmarks can have a similar effect. Although it is likely that after an 
allocation period the benchmarks would be adapted, benchmarks still offer 
a relatively high degree of predictability and also market visibility for new 
entrants because the incentive to reduce emissions is independent of the 
level of the benchmark, in contrast with historical grandfathering. 
Additional predictability is provided by the fact that until 2027 at the latest 
there would also be full auctioning for the industrial sectors that are not 
exposed to carbon leakage. 
2.8  Benchmark values freeze the inter-sectoral allocation with 
implications for cap-setting, expansions and the move to the 
30% target  
The setting of the benchmarks defines the total sector emissions cap as a 
result of the activity rate, i.e. production, being fixed by historical data. At 
the same time, this defines the distribution within the sector. That being the 
case, the boundary conditions of the benchmarks can make a difference for 
intra-sectoral distribution – a topic that has also been discussed in section 
2.4.  
For the overall and sectoral caps benchmarks can be used but it is not 
necessary to do so. Such an approach may even have disadvantages. Basing 
                                                      
21 Uncertainty relates to demand, prices for electricity and other products, factor 
prices (primary energy, feedstock, labour, transport, etc.), technological progress, 
competitors’ strategies as well as regulatory risks, under which the EU ETS falls.  34 | IMPLICATIONS FOR EU ETS ALLOCATION 
 
the sectoral or the overall caps on benchmarks will tend to lead to a race to 
the bottom concerning the level of the cap, more specifically towards an 
argument for high benchmark values, which define the inter-sectoral 
burden-sharing. Some sectors may be better in arguing for high benchmark 
values than others. Typically, benchmark values can be modified by 
including or excluding outliers, i.e. very efficient installations. This topic is 
most important where there is a high spread between the performance 
levels of installations in the same sector. The topic is analysed in greater 
detail in section 2.2 on considerations for the identification of 10% most 
efficient. Another way of setting total sector allocation, i.e. the sectoral cap, 
would be to base it on a percentage reduction (e.g. 21%) of historical 
emissions and apply benchmarks only thereafter to settle the intra-sectoral 
allocation (distribution). On the other hand, an equal reduction effort per 
sector in the future trading period might discourage companies from 
undertaking reduction efforts as they would potentially receive a more 
ambitious benchmark value.  
Benchmark values of different ambitions among sectors can distort 
the inter-sectoral distribution. This could happen in the case of the EU 
moving to a higher target than the current 20% reduction target. A uniform 
cross-sectoral correction factor to ensure a reduced cap would in many 
cases have a more significant impact on costs in those sectors that have 
already started from a more ambitious benchmark value.  
Similar issues arise in the case of EU ETS expansion. The benchmark 
values chosen for the newly introduced sector will most likely have 
impacts on inter-sectoral allocation, although only for the following trading 
period, should a uniform reduction figure be applied. Those sectors that 
argue successfully for high benchmark curves will fare comparatively 
better than those with higher values. This will put significant pressure on 
the European Commission and member states when defining the 
benchmark values for new sectors. 
2.9  Data collection and measurement systems  
Ultimately, benchmarking depends on reliable and credible measurement 
systems and verification. In the EU ETS, monitoring, reporting and 
verification are based on the MRGs for GHG emissions. Art. 14 of the ETS 
Directive requires member states to ensure that operators of installations 
and aircraft operators monitor and report their GHG emissions in 
accordance with these guidelines, which are legally binding. The MRGs BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 35 
 
were revised on 18 July 2007 for the second phase. The main changes were 
to improve cost-effectiveness, for example by  
•  relying more on common industrial practices regarding the 
monitoring and reporting done by operators (e.g. use of standard 
factors for commercial fuels);  
•  allowing lighter monitoring requirements for small installations or 
small emitters with less than 25,000 tonnes of CO2 annually, for 
installations using biomass fuels, and for the development of 
electronic templates and monitoring plans; or  
•  aligning the guidelines better with reporting made by member states 
under national GHG inventory requirements.  
Strengthening the verification procedures of the monitoring and reporting, 
originally an area for concern, was meant to increase environmental 
integrity. During 2008 and 2009, several amendments were added: MRGs 
for activities emitting nitrous oxide (N2O from the production of nitric acid, 
adipic acid, glyoxal and glyoxylic acid); MRGs for emissions and tonne–
kilometre data from aviation activities; and MRGs for emissions from 
capturing, transport and geological storage of CO2. For the third phase, the 
European Commission will adopt a regulation that will monitor emissions 
as well as (where relevant) activity data. Member states and the 
Commission are required to maintain the secrecy of commercially sensitive 
data.  
With emissions per installation being published on the CITL, the 
publication of activity data would automatically reveal the production of a 
plant. But at most sites several products are produced. This means that 
individual production data will remain hidden (e.g. in the chemical or 
paper industries). Within the EU ETS, such data remains restricted to use 
by the member states and the European Commission. In private (industry-
driven) benchmarking exercises, databases are managed by a third party, 
typically a consultant, which publishes the data in a de-identified format. 
The consultant develops the database system, collates the reported data, 
analyses the results of various statistical queries, and produces 
consolidated (de-identified) data and reports. Another possibility for single 
product sites is to make production data available with a delay. Generally, 
data collection can be a time- and resource-consuming process.  
Another reporting approach, for example, is the one used by the 
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Box 2.5 Reporting at the level of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change  
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) must submit national reports on implementation of the 
Convention to the Conference of the Parties (COP). The required contents of 
national communications and the timetable for their submission are different 
for Annex I and non-Annex I parties. This is in accordance with the principle 
of “common but differentiated responsibilities” enshrined in the 
Convention.  
The core elements of the national communications for both Annex I and 
non-Annex I parties are information on emissions and removals of GHGs 
and details of the activities a party has undertaken to implement the 
Convention. National communications usually contain information on 
national circumstances, vulnerability assessment, financial resources and 
transfer of technology, and education, training and public awareness; but 
the ones from Annex I parties additionally contain information on policies 
and measures.  
Annex I parties that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol must include 
supplementary information in their national communications and their 
annual inventories of emissions and removals of GHGs to demonstrate 
compliance with the Protocol’s commitments.  
Annex I parties are required to submit annual information on their 
national inventories, and to submit national communications periodically, 
according to dates set by the COP. There are no fixed dates for the 
submission of national communications of non-Annex I parties, although 
these documents should be submitted within four years of the initial 
disbursement of financial resources to assist them in preparing their national 
communications.  
Data reliability and quality 
Decision-making within the Convention is based upon the use of accurate, 
consistent and internationally comparable data on GHG emissions. Since 
1994, there have been major efforts in the preparation, collection and 
validation of data on GHG emissions, as well as efforts to improve the 
quality and consistency of the data, which are ensured by established 
guidelines for reporting. Non-Annex I parties receive financial and technical 
assistance in preparing their national communications, facilitated by the 
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Box 2.5 cont’d 
Each national communication of an Annex I party is subject to an ‘in-
depth’ review conducted by an international team of experts and 
coordinated by the secretariat. The review of each national communication 
typically involves a desk-based study and an in-country visit, and aims at 
providing a comprehensive, technical assessment of a party’s 
implementation of its commitments. The in-depth review results in an in-
depth review report, which typically expands on and updates the national 
communication. The reports also allow easier comparison of information 
among the national communications of parties, although no common 
indicators are employed. The in-depth review of the fourth round of 
national communications is due to be finished in 2009. National 
communications from non-Annex I parties are not subject to such a review, 
but they are considered by the expert group set up by the Subsidiary Body 
on Implementation. Inventories are subject to an annual technical review 
process. 
Submission of reports  
Parties submit their national communications to the UNFCCC secretariat 
and the most important information from submitted national 
communications is synthesised into separate reports for Annex I and non-
Annex I parties, which are considered by the subsidiary bodies and the COP.  
Reporting guidelines 
National communications 
For comparability in reporting, in preparing their national communications, 
Annex I parties are expected to follow reporting guidelines. These guidelines 
have been revised twice, at COP 2 (Geneva, July 1996) for the preparation of 
the second round of communications, and again at COP 5 (Bonn, 
October/November 1999), where revised reporting guidelines were adopted 
for the preparation of the third national communications. 
Annual national inventories 
Parties should submit their annual inventories using comparable 
methodologies agreed upon by the COP and any good practices agreed 
upon by the COP at a future session. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) develops guidance on good practices as part of its 
work related to uncertainties in inventories. Guidance on good practices 
may include, inter alia, advice on the choice of methodology, emission 
factors, activity data and uncertainties, and on a series of quality assessment 
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and quality control procedures that may be applied during the preparation 
of inventories. 
The quality and credibility of GHG inventories rely on the integrity of 
the methodologies used, the completeness of reporting and the procedures 
for the compilation of data. To promote the provision of credible and 
consistent GHG information, the COP has developed standardised 
requirements for reporting national inventories.  
The UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on Annual Inventories require 
Annex I parties, by 15 April each year, to provide annual national GHG 
inventories covering emissions and removals of direct GHGs (CO2, CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) from six sectors (energy, industrial processes, 
solvents, agriculture, land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) and 
waste), and for all years from the base year or period to the most recent year. 
The sectors are very broad and would require substantial sub-division to 
encompass, sector crediting, sector trading or benchmarking. 
Under the UNFCCC reporting guidelines for Annex I parties, inventory 
submissions are in two parts:  
•  a common reporting format (CRF) – a series of standardised data tables 
containing mainly numerical information and submitted electronically; 
and  
•  a National Inventory Report – a comprehensive description of the 
methodologies used in compiling the inventory, the data sources, the 
institutional structures and quality assurance and control procedures.  
The most recent reporting requirements for GHG inventories were 
adopted in 2005 to include IPCC good practice guidance for LULUCF. 
Annex I parties were also asked to use the CRF Reporter software for the 
submission of their annual greenhouse gas inventories due from April 2006. 
Source:  Contribution by Nick Campbell, Environment Manager, Fluorinated 
Products, Arkema S.A. For more information, see also the UNFCCC 
website (www.unfccc.int). 
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3.  LOOKING BEYOND THE EU – 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
WITH BENCHMARKING 
IN SUPPORT OF CLIMATE POLICY 
s this report has shown, benchmarks can create transparency and 
reinforce predictability. Thus, benchmarking could feature in the 
global climate-change negotiations while at the same time being a 
tool to improve the performance of industry, especially in the absence of a 
robust carbon price signal.  
There are a number of areas where benchmarking could play a role.  
It is very likely that the initial allocation of newly established cap-
and-trade systems will be for free, at least partially. Benchmark-based 
allocation is a tool for ensuring a high degree of fairness and effectiveness, 
and for rewarding the carbon-efficient firm. Benchmarks will be applied by 
definition if an intensity-based system is introduced. 
Benchmarks can become useful tools in identifying technology or 
performance opportunities or providing information on best practice. This 
has been one of the objectives of the Asia-Pacific Partnership. There is 
interest in benchmarks in emerging economies, provided they are applied 
in a purely domestic and voluntary context.  
At the level of international climate-change negotiations, benchmarks 
may be an aspect of sectoral approaches, including sectoral crediting, the 
sectoral CDM, the development of monitoring, reporting and verification 
rules and standards, the comparability of effort among parties and among 
sectors or the setting of caps for parties or sectors.  
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3.1  Use of benchmarks in domestic emissions-reduction 
legislation  
Benchmarks contribute to a number of areas in domestic climate-change 
policies in several countries.  
US 
At a federal level, there are two major legislative proposals currently under 
discussion by the US Congress. The Waxman–Markey bill22 was passed by 
the House of Representatives and is now in the Senate, while the Kerry–
Boxer bill23 was introduced in the Senate at about the same time. Both bills 
aim at establishing cap-and-trade systems that cover around 85% of US 
GHG emissions and provide specific portions of the total allowances under 
the cap for free to particular industrial sectors, including energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed businesses, oil refiners and certain electricity generators. 
Electricity and natural gas distributors will receive free allowances for the 
sole purpose of passing on their value to consumers in the form of low 
prices. Under both bills, in all cases the allocation principle 24  is 
grandfathering, i.e. the formulas use pre-determined percentages of 
historical emissions, or in some instances electricity use, and thus 
benchmarking is not employed.  
The two bills mention benchmarking outside the area of industry. 
The Kerry–Boxer bill utilises the Energy Star benchmarking tool of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under a new EPA Efficient 
Buildings Program that it establishes (Pew Center, 2009). The latter 
initiative would reward owners of buildings that achieve a minimum score 
                                                      
22 See the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA) of 2009, also known 
as H.R. 2454 or the Waxman–Markey bill, as passed by the US House of 
Representatives on 26 June 2009. 
23  See the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA), S. 1733, 
sponsored by Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer, as passed out of the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee on 5 November 2009. 
24 The Kerry–Boxer bill goes into further detail to allocate rebates to all emitters in 
an eligible sector that cover fully the cost of direct and indirect (from electricity 
use) emissions. The eligibility of a sector depends on its trade intensity (the value 
of exports being above 15% as a proportion of total revenue) and the energy or 
GHG intensity (with the energy bill or emissions being above 5% as a proportion of 
total revenues), or solely on its energy or GHG intensity if it exceeds 20%. BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 41 
 
of 75 on the EPA’s Energy Star. Similarly, the Waxman–Markey bill 
includes a definition of measurement protocols for benchmarks of building 
energy performance. Such protocols are to serve as a methodology for 
defining a benchmark for the energy performance of a specific building 
type and for measuring that performance against the benchmark.  
Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 10 states in the 
north-eastern US have put into operation a mandatory cap-and-trade 
programme that reduces 2009 CO2 emissions from electricity generation by 
10% by 2018. The annual budget of allowances is distributed to each state 
in proportion to its historical emissions. All 10 states have decided to 
auction the vast majority of allowances available to them. Small amounts25 
are given for free, e.g. to power generators with long-term agreements for 
the purchase of electricity in the states of New York and Maryland. New 
York has made eligibility for this free allocation conditional on the 
installation having an emissions rate at or below a benchmark of 1,100 lbs 
(or ca. 499 kg)/MWh (ENE, 2009). 
California is considering the use of benchmarks for allowance 
allocation in the design of a future cap-and-trade programme under the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, but discussions are still underway, 
involving reports and opinions from several state policy and planning 
agencies along with numerous committees. For example, the Market 
Advisory Committee (2007) has recommended that, to the extent used, any 
free allocation should be based on environmental performance 
benchmarks. The California Public Utilities Commission (2008) and 
California Energy Commission jointly recommended differentiated 
allocation rates for coal-fired and gas-fired power plants based on fuel-
differentiated benchmarks. If emitters can reduce the carbon content of 
their power, the saved allowances can be sold to other entities in the 
market.  
Australia 
T h e  p r o p o s e d  C a r b o n  P o l l u t i o n  R e d u c t i o n  S c h e m e  ( C P R S )  w a s  
reintroduced with amendments to the Australian parliament in February 
2010 after it was defeated twice in the Senate in 2009. This scheme provides 
for free emission allocations to the so-called ‘emissions-intensive trade-
                                                      
25 The state of Delaware allocates for free a declining percentage of its allowances 
to all covered emitters in proportion to their emission levels (ENE, 2009). 42 | INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH BENCHMARKING 
 
exposed’ industry sectors. The programme employs benchmarks for two 
purposes. The first is to determine whether the ‘emissions intensity‘ level of 
a sub-sector is high enough to deem the activity eligible for free allowances. 
The second is to establish the ‘intensity-based allocative baselines’ for each 
activity, i.e. the baseline quantity of allowances available per unit of 
production. By comparing an activity’s emissions intensity with two 
thresholds, companies would receive 0%, 66% or 94.5% of the baseline 
permits for each unit of output they produce. The baseline level will shrink 
by 1.3% per annum starting in 2013, a practice that is termed ‘carbon 
productivity contribution’. 
The emissions intensity level is the sector-wide historical average26 of 
emission units per revenue. The ‘allocative baseline’ is a similar ratio but 
uses units of production instead of revenue. Where the activity is too recent 
to establish a domestic benchmark, i.e. lacking historical data or consisting 
of too small a sample of participating firms, the benchmark would be 
informed by a combination of an international best-practice benchmark and 
the international emissions-intensity level. For indirect industrial emissions 
through electricity use, a fixed allocation factor at 1 tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2-e) per MWh nationwide is used, which is a kind of 
benchmark, allowing for coal-based power production to continue. 
Benchmarks have also been used at a state level for cap-setting since 
2003 in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) of New South 
Wales. This scheme is closer to the baseline-and-credit kind, such as the 
CDM, since actual reductions come from projects. The constraint is not at 
the level of power-generating installations but on electricity retail 
companies that do not reduce emissions themselves. Instead, they purchase 
tradable abatement certificates, i.e. offset credits, from accredited domestic 
providers for the emissions beyond the amount assigned to the electricity 
that each company has sold in a year. The total available emissions amount 
for the state is based on a mandatory GHG emissions factor or benchmark 
expressed in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2-e) per capita from 
electricity consumption in that state. In 2007, this factor was 7.27 tCO2-e per 
capita (GGAS, 2008) and will stay at that level until 2021. This is 5% below 
the state’s per capita emissions in the Kyoto Protocol baseline year of 1990.  
                                                      
26 The formula uses the total production output over a two-year period as a weight. 
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New Zealand 
The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme started operation in 2008 and 
is to be fully phased in by 2013. Then it will cover GHG-emitting activities 
in all major sectors of the economy: forestry, stationary energy, industrial 
processes, transport fuels, agriculture, synthetic gases and waste, reflecting 
the principal sources of emissions (Emissions Trading Scheme Review 
Committee, 2009). 
The 2009 amendment foresees benchmarks to govern the free 
allocation granted to assist emissions-intensive sectors that are seen at risk 
of losing competitiveness (New Zealand Government, 2009). This clause is 
also aimed at aligning the New Zealand ETS design with the CPRS in 
Australia. Similar to the CPRS, the baselines will be based on the industry 
average emissions and electricity use per unit of production output. 
Australian baselines may be used instead of domestic ones, but the 
electricity allocation factor will be determined domestically. The New 
Zealand design differs in the portion of assistance, set at 60% and 90% of 
the baseline permits from 2013. The assistance rate will only be half of the 
above, i.e. 30% and 45%, during the generally less-demanding phase-in 
period 2010–12.  
In principle, the scheme operates with absolute caps but it foresees a 
possibility to switch over to an intensity-based system if international 
climate-change agreements in the future include intensity-based 
approaches, e.g. through sectoral agreements in sectors such as steel, 
cement and aluminium or other intensity-based methods. Then, firms 
would have to surrender allowances if their emissions per unit of output 
were above the agreed sector- or firm-specific intensity benchmark.  
Japan 
Benchmarks have recently been introduced in Japan27 under the existing 
Energy Efficiency Law,28 which aims at improving annual energy intensity 
                                                      
27  Information in this section is primarily based on the presentation by Akihiro 
Matsuta, Deputy Director of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Division, 
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy at the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, “Introduction of Benchmarks under the Energy Efficiency Law 
in Japan”, at the meeting of the CEPS Task Force on “Benchmarking for the EU ETS 
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by 1% on average or sometimes more. The purpose is to ensure fair 
evaluation for the progress of energy efficiency in domestic industries and 
consistency with international discussions in the UNFCCC, the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership (APP) and industry associations under the Keidanren 
Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment (see also the next section) or 
potential future sectoral approaches. Among other aspects, the principles 
for employing benchmarks entail evaluating total energy consumption, 
including indirect energy use (of electricity, for instance) and reporting the 
benchmark value for the entire company rather than individual facilities. 
Sector benchmarks for the iron and steel industry, the cement industry 
(with a denominator based on clinker) and thermal power plants have been 
introduced so far. Expansion to other industries is foreseen.  
The benchmark indicator is energy intensity in terms of energy 
consumed per unit of production. The target benchmark level in each sub-
sector is set at the average energy intensity minus the standard deviation, 
thus around 10% to 20% of companies perform better than the benchmark.  
Japan would like to apply benchmarks in the future domestically at 
first, i.e. using them as a basis for a domestic climate-change regulation. 
The Advisory Committee on the Emissions Trading Scheme29 is considering 
benchmarks based on industry-specific emissions intensity as one of the 
methods for possible free allocation under a future Japanese ETS, but 
discussions are continuing. Internationally, there is interest in future CDM 
methodologies based on benchmarks and in benchmarks as a comparative 
tool for energy or carbon-saving efforts. Relevant activities underway 
include extending their use through the APP and bilateral cooperation with 
developing countries, such as the data collection by the APP Steel Task 
Force and the APP Cement Task Force founded on a common methodology 
under Japan’s initiative, and international standardisation for CO2 
intensities through the ISO. 
                                                                                                                                       
28 The law itself has been in force since 1979. 
29 The committee was set up by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment to 
explore concrete scheme designs taking into account the actual situation of Japan 
and with a view to examining the effectiveness of and the need for an emissions 
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3.2  Domestic programmes and initiatives with benchmarking 
elements 
A number of domestic initiatives involve benchmarking elements at least in 
the area of reporting energy use and GHG emissions from participating 
companies. Some of them incorporate the development of performance 
indicators and comparisons among participants. Table A.1 in appendix 1 
provides an overview of the benchmarking elements for different sectors 
under a number of initiatives worldwide.  
US 
The US EPA Energy Star for Industry is a voluntary programme for 
manufacturing sectors. It involves industry-specific energy management 
tools and resources that help improve energy performance. An energy 
performance indicator (EPI) is one such tool for evaluating the energy 
efficiency of plants relative to that of the industry (Newman, 2009). So far, 
there are EPI modules for cement, corn refining and motor vehicle 
manufacturing. 
Japan 
The Keidanren 30   Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment has 
coordinated since 1996 the action plans of 35 industry sectors that have 
developed their own numerical targets based on performance indicators, 
including gross CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions per output, energy 
consumption and energy input per unit of output. The Japanese Iron and 
Steel Federation, for example, has set a target of reducing energy 
consumption in 2010 by 10% from the 1990 level (Global Environmental 
Subcommittee and Expert Committee, 2008).  
China 
For the cement sector in China, the Benchmarking and Energy Saving Tool 
(BEST) Cement takes into account the energy performance of cement 
production. Using this tool for self-assessment, the plants benchmark their 
energy use against best-practice levels and evaluate energy efficiency 
measures. Newman (2009) mentions it as a possible model for benchmark-
                                                      
30 Nippon Keidanren is the Japan Business Federation – see the Nippon Keidanren 
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based sectoral approaches because it is complete and flexible in its 
calculation of the performance indicators and metrics. It has been 
developed by the (US-based) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory with 
collaborating institutes.  
Mexico 
The “Program GHG Mexico”31  is a voluntary GHG inventory-reporting 
initiative that also provides technical tools and training, using the 
accounting and reporting principles of the World Resources 
Institute/WBCSD Greenhouse Gas Protocol. The government sees it as a 
step towards sectoral emissions trading in the future, followed by an 
economy-wide cap. 
3.3  Multilateral benchmarking initiatives and exercises 
UNFCCC progress on sectoral approaches 
The Bali Action Plan noted the consideration of “cooperative sectoral 
approaches and sector-specific actions” (para. 1 (b)(iv)), as well as ”various 
approaches to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation 
actions” (para. 1 (b)(v)). These two topics are within the scope of work of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-
LCA) under the UNFCCC. Work is likely to continue.  
Under market-based mechanisms and existing mechanisms in 
particular, the AWG-LCA has been considering the establishment of 
benchmarks for baseline setting and the determination of additionality for 
specific CDM project types as one of the revisions of the CDM aimed at 
ensuring environmental integrity (AWG-LCA, 2009). 
Methodologies under the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation 
The CDM in its current form is not benchmark-based since it compares 
performance with project baselines rather than sectoral best practice. 
Nevertheless, performance indicators and measurement methodologies are 
applied, which provides lessons for benchmarking. CDM methodologies 
are a useful starting point for addressing measurement issues, for instance 
                                                      
31 See the Programa GEI México website at http://www.geimexico.org/. BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 47 
 
setting system boundaries and correcting for leakage (Newman, 2009). 
Various CDM methodologies have been developed, e.g. those for cement, 
iron and steel, and aluminium. 
Sectoral benchmarking is relevant to the CDM, to the revision of the 
CDM that is underway and to the development of a future sectoral CDM 
and other sectoral crediting mechanisms. It involves a dynamic baseline 
that is based on a pre-determined benchmark indicator (e.g. for emissions 
per tonne of production) for an entire sector or sub-sector in a country or a 
region (Fujiwara, 2009). Such a benchmark is particularly useful for 
demonstrating project additionally and thus ensuring environmental 
integrity. For example, a recent CDM methodology for refrigerators uses 
benchmarking.  
The Cement Sustainability Initiative under the WBCSD, together with 
Ecofys, has developed a benchmarking CDM methodology for the cement 
sector. It was submitted to the CDM Executive Board in April 2009 after 
having been tested in existing CDM projects and having received feedback 
from stakeholders. The methodology uses benchmarks based on the carbon 
intensity per cement or clinker tonne in a given region and is used to 
calculate baseline scenario emissions and demonstrate additionality 
(Fujiwara, 2009). The reference data is based on the local and global 
performance indicators, sourced from the CSI Cement Industry Database 
under the GNR initiative (see chapter 1) and is consistent with the Cement 
CO2 Protocol. Apart from demonstrating additionality, the environmental 
integrity is enhanced owing to the dynamic nature of the baseline, adjusted 
for business-as-usual improvements.  
The joint implementation (JI)32 track II may apply an approved CDM 
baseline methodology or develop its own approach (Fujiwara, 2009). In 
February 2009, the JI Supervisory Committee decided to develop a 
determination and verification manual, to include guidance on baseline 
setting, monitoring and additionality.  
 
 
                                                      
32 JI is another flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, similar to the CDM 
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Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
The APP,33  a public–private partnership that consists of seven partner 
countries (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and the US), represents international sectoral cooperation through sector-
specific task forces that seek to identify and share experiences along with 
best practices, indicate possible performance benchmarks and collaborate 
on research activities. APP task forces cover data-gathering and 
benchmarking exercises for three energy supply sectors (cleaner fossil 
energy, renewable energy and distributed generation, power generation 
and transmission) and five energy-intensive sectors (steel, aluminium, 
cement, coal mining, buildings and appliances). The Steel Task Force has 
produced a State-of-the-Art Clean Technology Handbook containing 
information on energy-saving technologies and practices in the iron and 
steel industry, and has evaluated the potential for CO2 emission reductions 
for each selected technology. The Cement Task Force has moved on to data 
collection using common boundaries, indicators and investigation methods 
after agreeing on a benchmark for CO2 intensity. BEST Cement for China 
was one of the deliverables of the Cement Task Force. The Aluminium Task 
Force has established benchmarking indicators (IAI, 2009) and indices that 
will support, inter alia, perfluorocarbon emissions management, fluoride 
emissions management and recycling. 
International Energy Agency activities 
The benchmarking exercise by the International Energy Agency (IEA) has 
developed a comprehensive overview of existing and potential efficiency 
performance indicators for industry. The IEA was asked by the Gleneagles 
G8 summit to identify best practices and indicate the potential for 
improvements in energy efficiency in buildings, appliances, transport and 
industry. As a result, the IEA conducted an in-depth analysis of indicators 
and provided state-of-the-art data and analysis on energy use, efficiency 
developments and good policy practices (see IEA, 2008). 
 
                                                      
33 See the Asia-Pacific Partnership website at www.asiapacificpartnership.org; see 
also Fujiwara (2007).  
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4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
his report has sought to highlight some of the key issues arising from 
the current benchmarking exercise under the EU ETS, in the context 
of determining the temporary free allocation for 2013–20. These 
issues have been discussed and analysed in chapter 2, leading in some 
cases to recommendations. Earlier, chapter 1 examined the origins, the roles 
and experiences of existing benchmarking exercises to draw some general 
conclusions about the main elements and challenges common to all 
exercises, but also to show the different objectives that benchmarks and 
benchmarking can have. These conclusions and illustrations in turn have 
consequences for the design and implementation of both benchmarks and 
benchmarking. It is hoped that this chapter has helped to clarify both the 
definitions and terminology. Finally, chapter 3 has illustrated the role of 
benchmarking for mitigation actions worldwide. Exercises and initiatives 
outside the EU at the national, industry and UNFCCC levels provide the 
EU process with a context and further relevance for the international efforts 
to tackle climate change.  
The EU’s experience with the NAPs in phases I and II of the EU ETS 
and that gathered from other national practices has provided a wealth of 
information and lessons upon which the EU can draw. For the future we 
would expect that other countries would grapple with the same issues as 
the EU, for example when making free allocations, setting the distribution 
of the burden among sectors and establishing national caps in a bottom-up 
fashion, but also for the purpose of crediting within a new sectoral 
crediting mechanism or a revamped CDM (or both). Some of the issues that 
have been discussed likewise emerge in benchmarking approaches that aim 
at measuring performance with a view to improving it and cutting out 
waste. The focal points for discussion in these areas are the benchmarks as 
such, far more than benchmarking, which has the additional complication 
of adding activity rates to the benchmarks, a field that has its own 
complications.  
T  
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACESA   American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) 
APP   Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
AWG-LCA  Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the UNFCCC 
BEST  Benchmarking and Energy Saving Tool 
BREFs   Best-available techniques reference documents 
CCS  Carbon capture and storage 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CEI™ Carbon  emissions  intensity 
CEJAPA   Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733) 
CEMBUREAU  European Cement Association 
CH4   Methane 
CHP  Combined heat and power 
CITL  Community Independent Transaction Log for the EU ETS 
CO2 Carbon  dioxide 
CONCAWE  Oil companies’ European association for environment, health 
and safety in refining and distribution 
COP   Conference of the Parties 
CPRS   Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Australia) 
CRF   Common reporting format 
CSI  Cement Sustainability Initiative (under the auspices of the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development) 
CWBTM  Complexity weighted barrel 
CWT  Complexity weighted tonne 
DG   Directorate-General of the European Commission 
EII®  Solomon’s Energy Intensity Index 
EPA  US Environmental Protection Agency 
EPBD   Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2002/91/EC) 
EPI   Energy performance indicator 
ETS  Emissions trading system/scheme 
EU ETS  European Union Emissions Trading System BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 51 
 
EuPs   Energy-using products regulated by the Ecodesign Directive  
GGAS   Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (Australia) 
GHG Greenhouse  gases 
GNR   “Getting the Numbers Right” – a CSI initiative  
HFCs Hydrofluorcarbons 
IAI International  Aluminium  Institute 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPPC  Integrated pollution prevention and control 
ISO   International Organization for Standardization  
JI Joint  implementation 
LULUCF  Land use, land use change and forestry 
MRGs   Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines 
MRV  Measurement, reporting and verification 
MWh Megawatt  hour 
NAPs   National allocation plans 
N2O   Nitrous oxide 
NGO Non-governmental  organisation 
PFCs Perfluorocarbons 
RGGI   Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
SF6   Sulphur hexafluoride 
t Metric  tonne 
tCO2  Metric tonne of carbon dioxide 
tCO2-e  Metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (quantities of 
GHGs) 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
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APPENDIX 1. INITIATIVES WITH BENCHMARKING ELEMENTS 
Table A.1 Existing programmes and research on benchmarking and best practice assessment: Progress in developing 
measurement protocols, performance indicators and technology guides 
  General  Cement  Iron & Steel  Aluminium 
 MP    PI   TG   MP   PI   TG   MP   PI   TG   MP   PI   TG  
Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative   X   X   X   X  
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Monitoring and 
Reporting Guidelines  
X   X   X   X  
Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI)     (1)   (ra)      
World Steel Association (WSA)         X   (r)◊**  
International Aluminium Institute (IAI)             X   (ra)  
Benchmark-based EU ETS allowance allocations*   X     X     X     X  
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
methodologies  
 
?  
 
?  
 
?  
 
European Integrated Pollution and Control Bureau 
(EIPPCB)  
  
(s)   X  
 
(s)   X  
 
(s)   X  
International Energy Agency (IEA) Greenhouse Gas 
R&D Programme  
  
(b)   X  
 
(b)   X  
 
(b)   X  
Asia-Pacific Partnership     ◊   ◊?   ?   ◊   ◊?   X     ?   ?  
Canada: Industry Program for Energy Conservation 
(CIPEC)  
        
(rp)  
  
(rp)  
 
Flanders: Benchmarking Covenants           ?   (rw)        BENCHMARKING IN THE EU | 57 
 
Table A.1 cont’d 
Japan: Federation of Economic Organisations 
(Keidanren) Agreements  
        
(rg)  
  
(rg)  
 
Mexico: GHG Program     (1)   (r)                
Netherlands: Benchmarking Covenant     ?   (rw)    ?    (rw)         
UK: Climate Change Agreements       (rg)      (rg)           
US: EPA Energy Star for Industry; Energy 
Performance Indicator (EPI)  
  
(rp)   X  
       
US: EPA Climate Leaders Program   (rg)                    
US: 1605b reporting   (r)     (r)       (r)       (r)    
US: Climate VISION                      
Benchmark-based EU ETS allowance allocations -
Phases II & III  
(ps)  
 
(ps)  
  
(ps)  
  
(ps)  
 
* Various countries (Belgium (in both Flanders and Wallonia), Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden) have used benchmarking as an explicit factor in 
distributing EU ETS allowances. These countries and regions, plus Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK, have also used 
benchmarking to allocate allowances to new market entrants. 
** Although individual plant data is aimed at, to date the majority of plants are not yet covered, including those in China. 
MP = Measurement protocol 
PI = Performance indicator 
TG = Technology guides (best practice) 
(1) = Based on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative 
(◊) = Under development 
(b) = Performance of hypothetical best-practice plant 
(s) = Performance of a small sample of plants 
(r) = Performance of individual plants/corporations reported to registry 
(rg) = Publicised corporate/sectoral goals 
(rp) = Anonymous peer comparison 
(ra) = Global/regional averages published 
(rw) = Compared with world-class plant 
(ps) = Research into performance standards
 
Source: Adapted from Newman (2009, p. 6).  
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